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INTRODUCTION
The Board of Pensioners of the City of Philadelphia smelled a
rat. After investing more than $3 million in Network Associates
Inc., the company's stock suddenly plummeted from $67 to $13 per
share.! The Board carefully selected an experienced law firm it had
used successfully to prosecute securities-fraud claims in the past,
and directed its lawyers to investigate Network Associates.2 This
investigation confirmed the Board's suspicions of impropriety; the
rat it smelled was a scheme by the officers and directors to commit
accounting fraud and insider trading.' With a successful record of
prosecuting securities class actions, and as one of the nation's
largest institutional investors, the Board stepped forward to protect
itself and similarly situated investors by filing a securities class-
action suit against Network Associates.4 Because the Board was
the investor before the court with the largest financial interest at
stake, the court-following the express language of the Private
Fred B. Burnside is an Attorney at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and
specializes in class-action litigation.
1. In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019, 1030
(N.D. Cal. 1999).
2- See id. at 1030-31 (discussing the Board's retention of the Barrack, Rodos
& Bacine law firm).
3. See id. at 1030.
4. See id.
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Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") 5-quickly
appointed it to serve as the "lead plaintiff., 6 Consequently, the
Board was responsible for selecting and retaining counsel, and
generally overseeing the prosecution of the suit.7
Then something strange happened. The court informed the
Board that it could stay and prosecute the suit, but its lawyers
might have to go.8 The court severed the existing attorney-client
relationship and informed the Board that if it wished to prosecute
this litigation it would have to "re-open its consideration of
counsel; promptly publicize a request for written proposals from
counsel; evaluate the proposals; and interview counsel as
appropriate .... "9  Unhappy with the prospect of a shotgun-
marriage with strangers, the Board balked, and wrote a letter to
the judge explaining why it was withdrawing as lead plaintiff:
"The board is not equipped to engage in the process envisioned
by the court, nor do we believe such a process is required to
accomplish what the board understands [as] the court's
purpose: to obtain the highest quality representation at the
most effective price .... Moreover, because the selection
process called for in the order includes the subjective
evaluations of counsel unknown to us, while at the same time
includes some objective criteria, we are concerned, as a public
entity, that a disgruntled applicant could make unfounded
allegations that they were treated unfairly, and thus require the
board to expend additional resources defending itself against
such allegations."1
When another institutional investor stepped forward to
assume the lead-plaintiff role and also refused to comply with the
5. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995).
6. Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (2000) (discussing the appointment of lead
plaintiff).
8. See Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1030, 1034.
9. Id. at 1034.
10. CA Judge Picks Lone Investor for Lead Plaintiff After Pension Fund
Balks, 11 PENSION FUND LITIG. REP. 6 (2000) (quoting letter written to Judge
Alsup by the board).
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court-ordered bidding procedure, it too was removed as lead
plaintiff.1 Having driven out the two largest institutional investors,
the judge was forced to select an individual investor with losses of
approximately $24,000 to serve as lead plaintiff in this potentially
billion-dollar litigation.12 Thus, the court-ordered bidding process
drove away the two investors with millions of dollars in losses and
installed an investor with less than $24,000 at stake to oversee the
lawsuit.
This result is not what Congress intended. It drafted the
PSLRA to encourage the participation of large, sophisticated
investors in securities class actions." But because a few courts
persist in using bidding systems to select lead counsel-and
because the Third Circuit recently created a task force to evaluate
the propriety of such bidding-an analysis of competitive bidding
under the PSLRA is relevant, timely, and instructive.
This Article evaluates the use of a competitive-bidding,
auction-style selection method for appointing lead counsel in
securities class actions.15 Part I examines competitive bidding as a
means to select lead counsel through a summary of the case that
spawned the practice and is generally cited as authority for its use.
Part II analyzes the PSLRA provisions governing the selection of
lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Part III addresses the Reform
Act's legislative history and considers why courts have rejected
bidding in light of the PSLRA's objectives. Further, Part III
discusses additional reasons why courts should continue to reject
11. See id.
12. See id.; see also Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (noting that
eventual lead plaintiff Robert Vatuone's losses were approximately $23,500);
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, Damages Analysis for Network
Associates, Inc. (Dec. 1999) (on file with author) (estimating the value of the case
at approximately $1.6 billion).
13. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 (discussing Congress's desire to increase participation of
institutional investors in securities class actions).
14. See Press Release, Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Jan. 30, 2001).
15. The auctioning of class counsel should not be confused with auctioning
the claims of plaintiffs, as suggested by some scholars. See generally Jonathon R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auction Class Action and Derivative Suits: A
Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 458 (1993).
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competitive bidding. Part IV questions the marginal results that
have arisen in cases where competitive bidding has been used.
This Article concludes that competitive bidding for the selection of
lead counsel is neither beneficial to the class members nor
warranted under the PSLRA.
I. COMPETITIVE BIDDING-JUDGE WALKER'S ORACLE DECISION
Before the PSLRA's enactment in 1995, some judges,
attorneys, and scholars believed reform was needed in the federal
securities laws. 6 Five years earlier, espousing his belief that the
current method of attorney-fee calculation and selection of counsel
failed to provide sufficient monitoring of the lawyers representing
the class, Judge Vaughn Walker "call[ed] for future courts to rely
on new methods of determining attorney compensation in common
fund securities litigation" by adopting a novel idea: competitive
bidding for the selection of lead counsel.'7 Judge Walker's aptly
titled Oracle"8 decision defied the practice of determining fees at
the end of the litigation- and arguably Ninth Circuit precedent' 9-
instead selecting lead counsel by ordering all interested firms to
submit price bids for the position.' In the five-year interim
16. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
17. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689-90 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
18. Id.
19. See In re Northern Dist. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Tjhe right of litigants to choose their own counsel
is a right not lightly to be brushed aside .... This court is hesitant to force
unwanted counsel upon plaintiffs on the assumption that appointed counsel will
be adequate."); accord In re Mandell, 69 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1934). The
Mandell court specifically states that:
[W]e regard it as inimical to good administration to fasten an attorney on the
[client] against his will .... [N]o reason appears why the [client] should not
have been allowed to nominate another attorney satisfactory both to himself
and to the court. In depriving him of his privilege we think there was an abuse
of discretion.
Id.
20. See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 691. Lead counsel is charged with prosecuting
the litigation on behalf of the members of the class. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
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between Oracle and the PSLRA, no published decision followed
Judge Walker's competitive-bidding system. But since the passage
of the PSLRA in 1995, a few courts have experimented with this
alternative-selection scheme.'
A careful understanding of what Judge Walker saw as the
objectives of competitive bidding provides an insightful
background helpful in understanding the impetus behind securities
reform that resulted in the PSLRA's lead-plaintiff provisions. That
is, competitive bidding is an alternative reform measure that was
considered, but not adopted, by the Act's drafters. Understanding
why Judge Walker thought competitive market forces would
improve the lead-counsel selection process helps explain why
Congress adopted a different market-based approach.
Judge Walker reasoned that the competitive-bidding process
"most closely approximates the way class members themselves
would make these decisions and should result in selection of the
most appropriately qualified counsel at the best available price."'
His primary rationale for this new system was that no single client
had a large enough interest to monitor the lawyers: "Since it is in
the nature of class actions that no single class member has a
significant enough stake in the outcome to justify oversight of the
litigation, it is inconceivable that any 'shopping around' among
these law firms to arrange the best terms available will take
place."' In a prescient observation, Judge Walker noted that large,
sophisticated investors "such as insurance companies and product
4(a)(3)(B)(5) (2000).
21. See, e.g., In re Commtouch Software Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. C-01-00719
(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2001); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal.
2001), rev'd, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).; In re Comdisco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 141 F.
Supp. 951 (N.D. 111. 2001); In re Lucent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137
(D.N.J. 2000); In re Bank One S'holders Class Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 780
(N.D. I11. 2000); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In
re Network Assocs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688
(S.D. Fla. 1999); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998);
Raferty v. Mercury Fin. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12439 (N.D. I11. 1997);
California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
22- See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 690.
23. Id. at 693.
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liability defendants [do] engage in some price shopping for
lawyers," but none were involved in Oracle." According to
Walker's view, market forces would keep fees down and expedite
the litigation:
In the matter of attorney fees, the benefits of competitive
bidding include, among other things, a fee determined prior to
litigation and an increased ability on the part of counsel, the
parties and the court during litigation to forecast one (perhaps
the most) important variable for purposes of strategy,
settlement and the like. Successful plaintiffs' securities lawyers
are able to evaluate the value of a case accurately and bring
about its prompt resolution.25
Thus, because at the time Oracle was decided plaintiffs
typically did not have a significant stake in the outcome of the case,
Judge Walker believed market forces were necessary to ensure a
reasonable fee structure and the prompt resolution of the case.
Judge Walker then requested that any interested law firm
submit an application listing its qualifications and fee schedule.26
Of the twenty-nine firms who sought lead-counsel status, only four
bid.27 Judge Walker reviewed the four bids-although he expressly
abandoned any examination of the firms' quality because he
deemed it "impossible to distinguish among them in terms of their
background, experience and legal abilities"- and selected one
based on it "trump[ing]" the only other bid that conformed to the
"competitive market., 28  In deciding which bids replicated a
competitive market, the court decided that the bid should be one
where plaintiff lawyers "obtain a smaller fraction of the total
recovery the larger the recovery is, and a greater fraction of the
total recovery the longer they must wait to be paid."29 Thus, Judge
24. Id. An inference can thus be drawn that had sophisticated investors been
involved-as the PSLRA intends -competitive bidding would have been
unnecessary.
25. Id. at 695.
26. See id. at 697.
27. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
28. See id. at 547.
29. Id. at 546 (citation omitted).
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Walker selected as lead counsel the firm with the lowest bid
because he felt that bid best reflected the competitive market.
With Oracle as a backdrop, the objectives of competitive
bidding appear relatively simple: to replicate a market process in
selecting counsel to get the best representation for the best price.
But at least five courts rejected this bidding system prior to the
PSLRA's enactment.0 And although since then the overwhelming
majority of courts have not adopted competitive bidding, four
district courts have experimented with the auction system.' Thus,
despite the passage of an alternative reform measure, competitive
bidding continues in post-PSLRA securities actions. Before
considering whether competitive bidding is beneficial to the class,3
it must first be determined whether bidding is consistent with the
text and legislative history of the PSLRA.33
II. THE PSLRA's LEAD-PLAINTIFF AND COUNSEL SELECTION
PROVISIONS
"As long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,
there is generally no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain
30. See Cooperman v. Powell, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4941, at *4-*5 (D. Or.
Apr. 9, 1991); Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10384, at *12-
*13 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1991); In re Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
CV-90-2394 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master
File No. CA 90-3191 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med.
Benefits ERISA Litig., 886 F. Supp. 445, 460-61, n.29 (E.D. Pa. 1995); 1 ALBA
CONTE, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2.14 (2d ed. 1993) (citing In re In-Store
Advertising Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 90-5594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)); 4 HERBERT B.
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.86 (3d ed. 1992)
(noting that competitive bidding "has not been followed by other courts
generally").
31. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J.
2000); In re Bank One S'holders Class Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. IlL.
2000); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sherleigh
Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
32- See infra Part III.F.
33. Note also that differences in auction theory are beyond the scope of this
inquiry. The focus here is whether bidding is permitted under the PSLRA,
regardless of its alleged merits in application.
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language of the statute."34  The Act's plain language governing
lead-plaintiff and lead-counsel selection indicates that the plaintiff
with the largest loss is the presumptive lead plaintiff, who in turn,
selects and retains class counsel subject only to court approval:
(B) Appointment of lead plaintiff....
(iii) Rebuttable presumption -
(I) In general-Subject to subclause (II), for purposes of
subclause (i), the court shall adopt a presumption that the most
adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this title is
the person or group of persons that -
(aa) has either filed a complaint or made a motion in response
to a notice under subparagraph (A)(i);
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class; and
(cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .....
(v) Selection of lead counsel-The most adequate plaintiff
shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain
counsel to represent the class.35
Through the use of "shall," under subsection (a)(3)(B)(v), the
statute provides that the plaintiff with largest financial interest-
the presumptively most-adequate plaintiff-maintains sole
discretion to select class counsel, with the court maintaining veto
power. The majority of cases decided after the PSLRA support
this interpretation. For example, in In re Cendant Corp.
34. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i)-(v) (2000) (emphasis added).
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Litigation,36 Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit wrote that the
district court's "decision to hold an auction to select counsel was
inconsistent with the Reform Act, which is designed to infuse lead
plaintiffs with the responsibility (and motivation) to drive a hard
bargain with prospective lead counsel and to give deference to
their stewardship."37 Similarly, in In re Microstrategy Inc. Securities
Litigation,38 the court refused to read into the statute any
requirement that approval of class counsel should depend on a fee
agreement:
And, while plaintiff's selection of lead counsel is 'subject to the
approval of the court,' approval should not be based on
whether plaintiff's chosen counsel promises to charge a cheaper
fee than anyone else.... [A] district court should approve
plaintiff's choice of lead counsel based solely on that counsel's
competence, experience, and resources, saving the question of
fees until the conclusion of the litigation.39
Likewise, Judge Rakoff in In re Razorfish, Inc. Securities
Litigation,' held that competitive bidding is not "remotely
consistent with the Reform Act .... By no reasonable reading of
this [statutory] language can the Court's right to disapprove lead
plaintiff's choice of counsel be transmogrified into a right to
arrange a shotgun marriage between strangers."'" Finally, Judge
Wilken in Steiner v. Aurora Foods42 also found bidding to be
inconsistent with the text of the PSLRA:
While competitive bidding has been adopted by some district
courts as a means to select lead counsel, the majority of courts
have not adopted such an approach. Furthermore, competitive
36. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19214 (3d Cir. Aug. 28,
2001).
37. Id. at *12.
38. In re Microstrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 437-38 (E.D. Va.
2000).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
41. Id. at 310.
42. Steiner v. Aurora Foods, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20341 (N.D. Cal. June 5,
2000) (citations omitted).
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biding appears to be contrary to the plain language of the
PSLRA, which states that the plaintiff chosen as lead plaintiff
"shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain
counsel to represent the class. ,1
3
Despite this "plain-meaning" interpretation, a few courts have
undertaken a more active role in "approving" class counsel. Citing
to the Conference Report to the PSLRA," a handful of judges have
held that the court may take control over selecting lead counsel
because, in their view, the "lead plaintiff does not come
inextricably tied to its counsel."4 Some judges have even read the
word "shall" out of the statute altogether. 6 But scholars have
questioned this interpretation:
One problem with this conclusion is that it is inconsistent with
the language of the PSLRA. The statutory text clearly vests the
lead plaintiff, not the court, with authority to select lead counsel.
Although the court can exercise veto power over the lead
plaintiff's selection, the statute provides no basis for the court
to override the plaintiff's selection and to impose its choice of
counsel or to presume that it exercise complete discretion with
respect to such selection.47
43. Id. at *16 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(V) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
44. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734 ("The Conference Committee does not intend to disturb
the court's discretion under existing law to approve or disapprove the lead
plaintiff's choice of counsel when necessary to protect the interests of the plaintiff
class.").
45. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998); In re
Milestone Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Cendant, 182
F.R.D. at 144).
46. See In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784
(N.D. Ill. 2000) ("It should be remembered that although Subsection (a)(3)(B)(v)
provides that the most adequate plaintiffs may 'select and retain counsel to
represent the class' that opportunity is expressly made 'subject to the approval of
the court."') (emphasis added).
47. Jill Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection
of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, §
IV.D, n.270 (2000) (emphasis added).
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The statutory text expressly vests the selection of counsel with
the lead plaintiff. The legislative history further confirms that the
PSLRA's goal was to empower investors-not courts-to select
counsel.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF AND LEAD
COUNSEL PROVISIONS OF THE PSLRA
On December 22, 1995, over President Clinton's veto,
Congress passed the PSLRA to modify the rules governing
securities class action litigation. 8 But the issue of securities reform
had been raised in Congress and the courts before then. As
already discussed, Judge Walker began experimenting with court-
imposed competitive bidding for the selection of lead counsel in
securities class actions as early as 1990."' Thus, years before the
PSLRA reached critical mass, there were legislative and judicial
discussions of competitive bidding.
A. Discussions of Competitive Bidding Prior to the PSLRA
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Chairman
Arthur Levitt testified before Congress in 1994 about class-action
reform proposals, and noted Judge Walker's handling of the Oracle
litigation as an example of how courts were attempting their own
reform." He cautioned, however, that price should not be the sole
determining factor: "the Commission recognizes that the best fee
arrangement is not necessarily the lowest fee arrangement and that
the quality of class counsel should be an important factor as well."5'
One month later, procedural scholar and Harvard Law School
professor Arthur Miller testified before Congress about
48. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995).
49. See supra Part I.
50. See Litigation Under TI-IF, Federal Securities Laws: Hearing Before the
House Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103rd Cong. (1994) (prepared statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
51. Id.
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competitive bidding, and warned against a system that would
elevate price over quality of representation, and of the dangers of
"pre-set" fee agreements:
At your last hearing, SEC Chairman Levitt described Judge
Walker's use of competitive bidding in the Oracle case .... My
own view is that competitive price bidding among counsel at the
outset represents a significant loss of control by the court acting
on behalf of the class. That system locks the class into paying a
set percentage (or a set sliding scale) of the recovery no matter
how the attorney performs. More importantly, competitive
bidding also has the potential to foster a "race to the bottom"
through which competing counsel cut fee and cost estimates to
the "barebones" with a view toward obtaining the appointment
rather than serving the class. Once counsel obtains control of
the case, there might then be a strong incentive to do as little as
possible to maximize profits. It also distracts the court from
looking at the qualitative differences among the applicants,
which frankness requires me to say can be considerable.
Thus, as Congress discussed and considered reforms of the
federal securities laws during 1994 and 1995, it considered
competitive bidding.
Five months later, turning again to academia, Congress shifted
from discussing problems to finding solutions by drafting the
PSLRA-and the PSLRA's academic underpinnings made clear
that monitoring of class counsel by sophisticated investors was the
preferred method for reform. The Senate Report, prepared as part
of the legislative history of the PSLRA, specifically states that a
Yale Law Journal article by Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman
"provided the basis for the 'most adequate plaintiff' provision."53
This statement was in a footnote attached to a sentence noting that
52. Securities Litig. Reform: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and Fin. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. (1994)
(prepared statement of Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley Professor of Law,
Harvard University Law School) (emphasis added).
53. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11, n.32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
690 & n.32 (citing Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995)).
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the then-existing system often worked to prevent sophisticated
investors from selecting counsel." The Weiss and Beckerman
thesis was that large, sophisticated investors "with the largest
stakes in class actions are better situated than plaintiff's attorneys
or courts to protect class members' interests," and thus should be
the presumptive lead plaintiff.5 As is evident from the statute,
Congress concurred with the authors' view and provided that the
plaintiff with the largest loss be the presumptive lead plaintiff. 6
Accordingly, the lead-plaintiff provisions adopted by Congress
were taken directly from Weiss and Beckerman's article, which
thus serves as a de facto proclamation of legislative intent. 7 A
review of that article is especially illuminating in analyzing whether
competitive bidding is appropriate under the PSLRA.
B. Weiss and Beckerman's "Let the Money Do the Monitoring"
In drafting the lead-plaintiff and counsel provisions, Congress
relied on Weiss and Beckerman's 1995 Yale Law Journal article,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions. That
article begins by stating that its proposed lead-plaintiff provisions
"would allow market forces, not courts, to play a dominant role in
determining who served as plaintiff's lead counsel in class actions
[and] how lead counsel would be compensated."59  Thus, an
inference can be drawn that the PSLRA sought to limit the court's
involvement in selecting lead counsel. But more than an inference
is provided.
54. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11.
55. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2121 (emphasis added).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
57. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 59 n.2 (D. Mass.
1996) ("The inspiration for this [lead plaintiff] provision was the article written
by Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104
YALE L.J. 2053 (1995); see also 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 690 n.32.
58. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16; see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11,
n.32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (stating that the Yale Law Journal
article "provided the basis for the 'most adequate plaintiff' provision.").
59. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2058 (emphasis added).
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The authors specifically distinguish their proposal-later
adopted by Congress-from Judge Walker's bidding system by
noting that their "market-based proposal has clear advantages
over" Judge Walker's Oracle decision.' They add that "[a]uctions
will do little to eliminate [unfounded] suits, and because of
informational problems, are unlikely to provide class members
with adequate compensation when their claims are meritorious."6
To resolve any potential ambiguity, they also explain that their
approach "would differ from that of Judge Walker in Oracle
Securities Litigation ....
In a passage that speaks directly to Judge Walker's concerns in
Oracle, the article discusses the need for the lead plaintiff to have a
substantial stake in the litigation: "Most critiques of class actions
assume that substantial agency costs are unavoidable because no
class member has a stake in the litigation large enough to justify
monitoring the attorneys who represent the class. This assumption
underlies ... Judge Walker's decision to auction off the lead
counsel position in Oracle."63 The authors add that, "[ilt would
seem to follow that, had [Judge Walker] believed the class included
a knowledgeable investor with a suitably large stake in the
litigation, the court's preference would have been to involve that
class member in the negotiation [of who would act as class
counsel].l " Thus, the lead plaintiff would be the person, group of
persons, or entity that would select counsel: "The change we
propose also will place institutional investors in a position to
negotiate fee arrangements with plaintiffs' lawyers before class
actions are initiated .... [I]t may well be that [these fee
arrangements] will differ substantially from the fee structures
courts currently employ."65
The authors also explain that their system would lead to fewer
baseless suits because the sophisticated investors "could then
negotiate fee arrangements with their attorneys that took account
60. Id. at 2107, n.257.
61. Id. at 2107.
62. Id. at 2107 n.256 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 2088.
64. Id. at 2088 n.190.
65. Id. at 2107 (emphasis added).
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of that possibility."66 Further, fee arrangements would be made by
clients, not courts: "The relevant attorneys' fee could be covered,
as they are now, by the fee arrangements institutions make with
lawyers they select to represent the class."67  These fee
arrangements would be fair to the class because the interests of
large, sophisticated investors "parallel the interests of the plaintiff
class much more closely than do the interests of plaintiffs'
attorneys or district judges, the parties now responsible for
protecting the class."68 And the changes "relating to the selection
of lead counsel"-later adopted-would "make it much easier for
institutional investors to serve as class representatives... [and] to
serve as effective litigation monitors."69
These passages indicate that the authors who provided the
basis for the lead-plaintiff provisions considered competitive
bidding as proposed by Judge Walker, but chose their own method,
which "has clear advantages over" bidding. The PSLRA's
legislative history further supports the conclusion that competitive
bidding for lead counsel is contrary to Act's intent.
C. The PSLRA's Committee Reports and the Congressional Record
When the Supreme Court examines legislative history it
recognizes that "the authoritative source for finding the
Legislature's intent lies in the committee reports on the bill .... ""
Accordingly, "[b]ecause the conference report represents the final
statement of terms agreed to by both houses, next to the statute
itself it is the most persuasive evidence of congressional intent.""
The Senate Report's discussion of selection of lead plaintiff and
counsel-and the Conference Report's incorporation of identical
language73 - contain numerous references to the empowerment of
66. Id. at 2123.
67. Id. at 2124.
68. Id. at 2121 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 2126.
70. Id. at 2107.
71. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
72. Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73. The Senate Report was ultimately replaced with the Joint Explanatory
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investors through the PSLRA. The Senate Report makes the Act's
intentions clear: "Specifically, [the PSLRA] intends: ... to
empower investors so that they not their lawyers exercise primary
control over private securities litigation .... "74  Likewise, the
Conference Report states that Congress intended for the lead
plaintiff, not the court, to select counsel: "These provisions are
intended to increase the likelihood that parties with significant
holdings in issuers.., will participate in the litigation and exercise
control over the selection and actions of plaintiffs counsel.""
Significantly, Congress alluded to the precise issue of who would
select lead counsel by reiterating that "[t]he Committee permits the
lead plaintiff to choose the class counsel. This provision is intended
to permit the lead plaintiff to choose counsel...."76 The Committee
also added that it did "not intend to disturb the court's discretion
under existing law to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel when necessary to protect the interests of the
plaintiff class."7  This language indicates that the lead plaintiff
should control the process of selecting and retaining counsel,
subject to the court's discretion to veto that selection only when
necessary to protect the interests of the class. Indeed, the
Conference Report seemingly resolves the issue of who selects
class counsel: "this lead plaintiff provision solves the dilemma of
who will serve as class counsel. Subject to court approval, the most
adequate plaintiff retains class counsel."78
The Congressional Record also proves insightful in
interpreting what Congress intended to accomplish with the lead-
plaintiff provisions. Shortly before the Act became law, Senator
Statement of the Committee of Conference, but the lead plaintiff provisions were
not substantively altered. Compare S. REP. No. 104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, with H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.
74. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
75. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731 (emphasis added).
76. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690
(emphasis added).
77. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
734 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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Christopher Dodd, a drafter and sponsor of the PSLRA,
emphasized that the Conference Report should convey investor
control by giving investors authority to select class counsel: "[T]he
conference report empowers investors so that they.., have the
greater control over the class action cases by allowing plaintiffs
with the greatest claim to be named plaintiff and allowing that
plaintiff to select their counsel."79 He later summarized what the
lead plaintiff provisions were designed to do in stating that "[w]hat
it does is strengthen the hand of investors tremendously by giving
them the right to choose the attorneys... and giving them the right
to determine what the attorney's fees would be. That is what we are
trying to do here."'
Thus, Judge Walker's idea of court-ordered competitive
bidding to select the least expensive counsel, while well-
intentioned, was considered and rejected by the drafters of the
PSLRA's lead-plaintiff provisions, and is contradicted by the
legislative history of the Reform Act.
D. Competitive Bidding Collides With the Express Language and
Underlying Goals of the PSLRA
1. The Cendant & MicroStrategy Decisions
Many post-PSLRA cases have rejected competitive bidding
for lead counsel as inconsistent with the Act's statutory language
and objectives. The two most detailed analyses of this issue have
come from the Third Circuit's Cendant' decision and the Eastern
District of Virginia's MicroStrategy decision." Both decisions
explain in great detail why competitive bidding is inconsistent with
the PSLRA's statutory mandates.
79. 141 CONG. REc. S17956 (daily ed. Dec. 5 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added).
80. 141 CONG. REc. S17988 (daily ed. Dec. 5 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added).
81. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19214 (3d Cir.
2001).
82 In re MicroStrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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In Cendant, Chief Judge Becker concluded that the trial
court's "decision to hold an auction to select lead counsel was
inconsistent with the Reform Act, which is designed to infuse lead
plaintiffs with the responsibility (and motivation) to drive a hard
bargain with prospective lead counsel and to give deference to their
stewardship."83  While the court stopped short of outlawing
auctions in every situation, it held that "lead counsel auctions are
generally (and the auction in this case was) inconsistent with the
statutory scheme embodied in the reform act."' Chief Judge
Becker emphasized that when appointing a lead plaintiff, judicial
intervention via auction misconstrues the context in which the
appointment is to occur:
We stress, however, that the question at this stage is not
whether the court would 'approve' that movant's choice of
counsel or the terms of its retainer agreement or whether
another movant may have chosen better lawyers or negotiated a
better fee agreement; rather the question is whether the choices
made by the movant with the largest losses are so deficient that
it will not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
class, thus disqualifying it from serving as lead plaintiff at all."
Indeed, the court later observed that a judge's decision to hold
an auction gives too little credence to the presumptive lead
plaintiff's choice of counsel:
[T]he question is not whether another movant might do a better
job of protecting the interests of the class than the presumptive
lead plaintiff; instead, the question is whether anyone can prove
that the presumptive lead plaintiff will not done a 'fair and
adequate' job. We do not suggest that this is a low standard,
but merely stress that the inquiry is not a relative one."
In rejecting competitive bidding, the court noted that to read
83. Cendant, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19214 at *12.
84. Id. at *122 n.45. The court allowed for the possibility of the court
selecting class counsel only where the lead plaintiff had "repeatedly undertaken a
flawed process of selecting and retaining lead counsel." Id. at *171.
85. Id. at *137-*38.
86. Id. at *145 (emphasis added).
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the PSLRA as allowing for auctions would mean that "the statute
in effect confers upon the court the right to 'select and retain'
counsel and limits the lead plaintiff to deciding whether to
acquiesce in those choices, thus eliminating any discretion on the
part of the lead plaintiff."87  Such a result, the court held, "is
inconsistent with the statutory text [of the PSLRA]." 8 Chief Judge
Becker thus recognized that the PSLRA severely limits the role of
the court in selecting class counsel:
(W]e think that the Reform Act evidences a strong presumption
in favor of approving a properly-selected [sic] lead plaintiff's
decisions as to counsel selection and counsel
retention .... [T]he question is not whether the court believes
that the lead plaintiff could have gotten a better deal. Such a
standard would eviscerate the Reform Act's underlying
assumption that, at least in the typical case, a properly-selected
[sic] lead plaintiff is likely to do as good a job or better than the
court at the tasks. Because of this, we think that the court's
inquiry is appropriately limited to whether the lead plaintiffs
selection and agreement with counsel are reasonable on their
89
own terms.
Simply put, a court cannot impose an auction because it
"prefers a process of counsel selection or retention that it, rather
than the lead plaintiff, controls, nor is it enough that the court
thinks that an auction is an inherently superior mechanism for
determining a reasonable fee."'  Instead, "under the PSLRA,
courts should afford a presumption of reasonableness to any fee
request submitted pursuant to a retainer agreement," and that
"presumption may only be rebutted by a prima facie showing that
the (properly submitted) retained agreement is clearly excessive."9
Accordingly, the Third Circuit in Cendant concluded that the
district court "abused its discretion by conducting an auction
because its decision to do so was founded upon an erroneous
understanding of the legal standards undergirding the propriety of
87. Id. at *168.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *169 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at *172-*73.
91. Id. at *188, *191 (emphasis added).
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conducting an auction under the PSLRA."92
The court in Microstrategy similarly rejected a putative lead-
plaintiff's suggestion to adopt competitive bidding as inconsistent
with the text of the PSLRA:
The final candidate was the so-called "Bidding Group,"...
[which proffered an] imaginative, if unauthorized proposal to
abandon the statutory lead plaintiff selection procedure and
adopt instead a competitive biding process. In so doing, the
group argued, legal fees would be set competitively and hence
they would be lower than fees would be otherwise. The short
answer to this argument is that it finds no warrant in the statute.
The PSLRA plainly states that a district court's duty is to
appoint a lead plaintiff based on the relevant statutory criteria,
while it is the lead plaintiff's duty to "select and retain counsel
to represent the class." And, while plaintiff's selection of lead
counsel is "subject to the approval of the court," approval
should not be based on whether plaintiffs chosen counsel
promises to charge a cheaper fee than anyone else. The ultimate
fee structure is within a district court's discretion throughout
the litigation, because, at the conclusion of the litigation, a
district court has a statutory obligation to ensure that the
ultimate award of attorney's fees is reasonable. Instead, a
district court should approve plaintiffs choice of lead counsel
based solely on that counsel's competence, experience, and
resources, saving the question of fees until the conclusion of the
litigation.
93
This reasoning blends the PSLRA's statutory text with its
legislative history. The text states that the person or group of
persons appointed lead plaintiff "shall" select counsel, and the
legislative history indicates that judicial discretion in approving the
selection of counsel should be guided by "existing law" -examining
competence, experience, and resources-and withhold approval
only "when necessary to protect the interests of the plaintiff
class."" As shown below, existing case law does not support
92. Id. at *180.
93. In re MicroStrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 437-38 (E.D. Va.
2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
94. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734 (emphasis added).
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competitive bidding.
2. "Select and Retain Counsel" v. "Subject to the Approval of the
Court"
The "approval of the court" referenced in the PSLRA's lead-
plaintiff provisions reiterates the court's existing discretion to
ensure that the "adequacy" prong of Rule 23 is satisfied.95 That is,
the most-adequate-plaintiff provision-which specifies the factors
the court should examine to determine if the presumptive
adequacy of the plaintiff the largest financial interest has been
rebutted-and the selection-of-counsel provision-which allows
the lead plaintiff to select counsel subject to court approval-are
simply the codification of existing Rule 23 case law.9" Even Judge
Walker has noted that "the PSLRA mirrors the lead plaintiff
adequacy requirement of FRCP 23(a)(4)."'  Indeed, Weiss and
Beckerman urged courts to interpret adequacy requirements to
coincide with their "most adequate" plaintiff analysis.98 The Third
Circuit has defined the adequacy prong in essentially the same
terms as the court in Microstrategy: "Adequate representation
depends on two factors: (a) the lead plaintiff's attorney must be
qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed
litigation, and (b) the lead plaintiff must not have interests
antagonistic to those of the class."99 Further, that the court should
exercise discretion only when necessary is also consistent with
existing Rule 23 case law, which has generally held that "[iun the
95. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 ("One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if... the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.") (emphasis
added).
96. See 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.56[6] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.
2000) ("[T]he provisions of the [Reform] Act do not replace the ordinary
adequacy requirements of Rule 23.").
97. Order at 4, Werner v. Quintus Corp., No. C-00-4263 (Feb. 16, 2001).
98. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2105 ("[A] court should
interpret Rule 23's requirements that a named plaintiff be able to represent the
class 'adequately' to mean that it should select as lead plaintiff the named
plaintiff capable of 'most adequately' representing class members' interests.").
99. Wetzel v. Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975).
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absence of proof to the contrary, courts [should] presume that class
counsel is competent and sufficiently experienced to prosecute
vigorously the action on behalf of the class."'"
In Microstrategy, Judge Ellis recognized that existing law gave
courts discretion to veto the most-adequate-plaintiff's selection of
counsel based on "counsel's competence, experience, and
resources," but not simply because another lawyer "promises to
charge a cheaper fee than anyone else.'' °. Thus, the "approval"
referenced in the statute's subject-to-the-approval-of-the-court
language should be based on the factors that existing case law have
relied upon. The SEC, whose opinions are entitled to deference in
the area of securities law,'" recently addressed this issue in an
amicus curiae brief to the Third Circuit, where it concluded that
bidding "may not have been appropriate."'0 3 In discussing the lead-
plaintiff's selection of counsel the Commission noted that court
approval was historically based on a Rule 23(a)(4) analysis:
(1) competence-experience and expertise-to conduct a class
action in the relevant area of law; (2) capacity, in terms of
financial resources, diligence and personal motivation, to
pursue the class action to a satisfactory conclusion; (3) freedom
from disabling conflict of interest; and (4) an appropriate
number of counsel, so as not to cause delay, disorganization, or
increased costs. 0 4
The SEC's position is that court approval of class counsel
should be based on selecting the highest caliber of counsel for the
class, not the cheapest fee. Similarly, the Second Circuit has noted
that "an essential concomitant of adequate representation is that
the party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to
100. Hewlett v. Premier Salons Int'l, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Md. 1997);
see also Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 161 (D. Kan. 1996).
101. In re Microstrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (E.D. Va.
2000).
102. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984); Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2000).
103. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Appellants on the Issue Specified at 23, In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter SEC Brief].
104. Id. at 18 (citing cases).
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conduct the proposed litigation."'05 The willingness to work for the
lowest fee has never been a criterion used by courts to ensure
vigorous and competent class representation.
A detailed adequacy analysis under Rule 23 was not intended
under the PSLRA.1 °  Indeed, the SEC has recognized that
Congress intended the PSLRA's financial-interest prong to act as a
proxy of adequacy-i.e., the "most adequate plaintiff "-with Rule
23 acting in a subservient role:
[T]he Reform Act and its legislative history reflect Congress'[s]
understanding of current law with regard to challenges of
adequacy of representation. The Act's standards for such
challenges must be viewed in the context of the lead plaintiff
provisions as a whole and of the Act's purposes. The Reform
Act specifies that the "most adequate plaintiff" is the plaintiff
or movant that "has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class" and otherwise satisfies the requirements of
Rule 23. The largest financial interest requirement was itself
designed to ensure more effective representation of investors in
securities fraud class actionsY°7
3. Competitive Bidding May Violate the Model Rules of
Professional Responsibility
The SEC's third historical factor-freedom from a conflict of
interest-may be violated by the use of competitive bidding. The
Third Circuit created a task force to evaluate whether competitive
bidding was appropriate in securities class actions, in part, because
Chief Judge Becker recognized that "many respected judges and
lawyers have opined that the bidding process is flawed in concept
and practice, and that it presents professional responsibility
problems.""1 8
105. Eisen v. Jacquelin, DeCoppet & Doremus, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir.
1968).
106. See Wenderhold v. Cylink, 188 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
107. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus
Curiae at 15, Bragdon v. Telxon Corp., 98-CV-2876 (N.D. Ohio April 28, 1999)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
108. See Press Release, Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Jan. 30, 2001).
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Some scholars suggest that a bidding system like the one used
in Oracle violates the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's
restrictions pertaining to fees, conflicts of interest, and prohibited
transactions."' Specifically, some have suggested that "preset fees
and... limit[s] on reimbursable expenses[] threaten to limit the
lawyer's ability to represent the plaintiff class fully and
faithfully.""0  One court commented that a bidding system with
capped expenses raises "a serious question as to the ethical
propriety of an agreement by counsel to bear the client's actual
out-of-pocket expenses without a right of reimbursement."'' . In
fact, professional-responsibility scholar Stephen Gillers.. has
submitted an ethics opinion in which he states that a fee agreement
with capped expenses is not permitted under either the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility."'
Another reason competitive bidding raises professional-
responsibility concerns is "because of the uncertainty about how a
court should determine the best interests of the class,. . . because
of the inflexibility of the scheme... [and because] the Rule [1.7]
seems not to allow an expense cap."" 4 Further, once a bid has been
accepted by the court, a crippling conflict of interest "could arise in
the event of an early settlement... between a lawyer's
representation [of the class] and other business or personal
interests of the attorney" as result of the ex ante bid structure." 5
109. See Steven A. Burns, Setting Class Action Attorneys' Fees: Reform Efforts
Raise Ethical Concerns, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1161, 1178-79 (1993) (noting
that competitive bidding violates Rules 1.5, 1.7, and 1.8 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct).
110. Id. at 1179.
111. In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1200 (N.D.
Ill 1996).
112- See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATIONS OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS (Aspen Law & Business 5th ed. 1998).
113. See Opinion by Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University Law
School on a Proposed Contingent Fee Arrangement in the In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Savings & Loan Sec. Litig., at 1-2 (June 26, 1990) (on
file with author).
114. Bums, supra note 109, at 1179-80.
115. Id. at 1184.
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Finally, a competitive-bidding system may be regarded as a
"prohibited transaction" under the Model Rules because it would
"produce a fee structure that would strain the attorney's ability to
deal with unexpected [financial] circumstances, thus potentially
compromising the representation of the client to a degree not
permitted by [the] Rules.""' 6
Accordingly, the "existing law" Congress intended to guide
courts in approving lead-counsel selection is not only devoid of
criteria that allow for competitive bidding, but illustrates that it
may actually conflict with lawyers' professional responsibilities.
E. Competitive Bidding Is Inconsistent With Rule 23
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not
encompass competitive bidding for the selection of lead counsel in
securities class actions. In discussing adequacy under Rule 23,
courts simultaneously examine both Rule 23(a)(4)-relating to
adequacy of representation-and Rule 23(d)(1),"7 which has been
interpreted to give the court power to appoint lead counsel based
on a finding that class counsel is inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4)."'
Indeed, Judge Walker relied on Rule 23(d) in Oracle as authority
for his appointment of class counsel."9 Rule 23(d)(1) has been
interpreted to allow a court to impose its own choice of counsel,
however, "only in 'extraordinary situations.",121 These
extraordinary situations deal with caliber of counsel, rather than
cost: "the overriding interest of the Court in designating lead
counsel in an action ... is the vigorous protection of the rights of
the plaintiff shareholders. This requires representation of the
116. Id. at 1188.
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1) ("In the conduct of actions to which this rule
[23] applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course
of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or
complication in the presentation of evidence or argument.").
118. See United States Trust Co. of New York v. Alpert, 163 F.R.D. 409, 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
119. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
120. Alpert, 163 F.R.D. at 423 (citing 2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACrIONS § 9.35 (3d ed. 1992)).
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highest caliber. ,."" Such a holding is inconsistent with
competitive bidding, which seeks to appoint counsel not based on
whether counsel is of the "highest caliber," but rather whether they
will conduct the litigation at the cheapest price. Competitive
bidding differs in objective from Rule 23 because it necessarily
results in only one winning law firm, whereas Rule 23's adequacy
requirements have never been interpreted to mean that only one
plaintiff or law firm can be adequate in a particular case. As
securities-law scholar and Columbia Law School professor John
Coffee has pointed out, "[y]ou can choose an inadequate lawyer,
but I don't think you can say that a lawyer is inadequate just
because some other lawyer beat them by a nickel on the
auction....""'
Competitive bidding may also conflict with Rule 23(e) if a
settlement is ultimately achieved. Rule 23(e) requires that the
court ensure a settlement is reasonable before approving it."n
Where a ceiling is put on fees at the start of the litigation-even if
that ceiling is merely a percentage of net recovery-the fee
structure "may be inconsistent with Rule 23, because the basic
premise of Rule 23 is that the fee has to be reasonable ....
Presumably, the requirement of Rule 23(e)-and the PSLRA 1 -
that the court ensure a reasonable fee is a two-way street; that is
under Supreme Court precedent, a disproportionately small
attorney fee would provide the class with "an unfair advantage" at
the expense of class counsel. 26  Bidding puts a limit on fees,
thereby preventing the court from allowing counsel "to restructure
its percentage bid in comparable hindsight terms to get a bigger
121. Percodani v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 51 F.R.D. 263, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(emphasis added).
122. Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, Public Hearings, Testimony of
Professor John C. Coffee, Transcript, at 187-88 (May 5, 2001) [hereinafter Coffee
Testimony].
123. See, e.g., Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 685, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
124. Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, Public Hearings, Testimony of
Arlin M. Adams, Transcript, at 83 (Mar. 016, 2001).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2000) (stating that the court must ensure a
reasonable fee).
126. Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1885).
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share of the recovery, ' '... even if an after-the-fact review
determines that class counsel deserve more compensation based on
the facts of the case-as is presently allowed for." An ex ante fee
determination is an amorphous concept because "'percentage' is a
relational concept. Percentage of what? Fifty percent is neither a
lot nor a little, until one knows what the underlying whole is. Half
of one cookie isn't much. Half a full cookie jar may well be a
lot."'29 How then, can a court adopting bidding ensure that fees are
reasonable as required by Rule 23(e)? It cannot. Flexibility is
paramount in determining attorney fees, and courts have long
recognized that the "ultimate responsibility for determining the
fairness to the class of settlement decisions which compromise class
interests" is not "entrust[ed] to the representative parties," but
solely to the court under Rule 23(e) . 3 By allowing one party to set
fees before an award is known, flexibility under Rule 23(e) is lost.
Finally, in a striking indication that the authority to order
competitive bidding in securities class actions is not within the
discretion afforded courts under Rule 23, the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, which is charged with evaluating federal rules
changes, specifically rejected such an approach: "Discussion of the
Rule 23 aspects of the securities litigation bills included a comment
on the practice adopted by some judges of soliciting bids by
competing firms to become class counsel. This procedure was said
to add an undesirable layer of complexity to getting class actions
initiated."'131 More recently, the Standing Committee of the Rules
of Practice and Procedure released proposed amendments to Rule
23-which discuss competitive bidding in the committee notes-
127. Order at 10, In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., No. 01-C-2110 (N.D. Ill. June 25,
2001).
128. See, e.g., In re Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995)
(approving an increase in attorney fee percentage from the benchmark of 25% to
33% based on complexity, risk, and non-monetary benefits).
129. In re Superior Beverage/Glass Container Consol. Pretrial, 133 F.R.D.
119, 125 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (emphasis in original).
130. Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 77 F.R.D. 685, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (citation
omitted).
131. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Meeting Minutes, Feb. 16-17, 1995
(emphasis added).
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and proposed-Rule 23(h) (regarding appointment of class counsel)
specifically notes that competitive bidding is not allowed under the
PSLRA.'32 The Supreme Court has noted that in interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the meaning given by the
Advisory Committee is to be given great weight.13  If the drafters
of both the lead-plaintiff provisions and the Federal Rules
considered and rejected competitive bidding in securities class
actions, from whence does the authority to institute competitive
bidding arise? It does not exist.
1. Beyond Cendant & Microstrategy
As shown below, many courts have expressly rejected
competitive bidding as inconsistent with the text and purposes of
the PSLRA; other courts, however, reject it without mention,
failing to discuss their rejection of a party's proposal that it be
undertaken.' While only one circuit court has squarely addressed
the issue, many district courts have weighed-in on the issue and
rejected competitive bidding as well.
In a recent case, Judge Rakoff in In re Razorfish Securities
Litigation,"' rejected the suggestion of competitive bidding in no
uncertain terms: "[Competitive bidding] is not, in this Court's view,
132. See Text of Proposed Changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,
Committee Note par. (1)(a) (noting that PSLRA provisions "contain specific
directives about selection of a lead plaintiff and the retention of counsel. This
subdivision does not purport to supersede those provisions, or any similar
provisions of other legislation.").
133. See Mississippi Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946).
134. Many of the courts offered the prospect of engaging in bidding proposals
simply ignore it in their orders. See, e.g., Sutton v. MarchFirst, Inc., 00-C-6676
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2001) (minute order provides for counsel to submit fee
agreement to court, but implicitly rejected earlier suggestion of defendants to
adopt competitive bidding by not doing so); In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ.
No. 00-5364 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2001) (appointing the New Hampshire Group as
lead plaintiff over defendant's suggestion of competitive bidding); Rosenberg v.
Nationsbanc Montgomery Sec. Inc., No. C-98-20956 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1998)
(appointing lead counsel without resorting to bidding despite the request in prior
pleadings of one group of plaintiffs to auction off lead counsel position).
135. In re Razorfish Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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remotely consistent with the Reform Act ... . "136 The court added
that under a bidding system "the presumptive lead counsel is the
cheapest lawyer, who then is more or less forced upon the largely
irrelevant lead plaintiff."'37 The court recognized Congress's intent
to empower, not trivialize, the role of lead plaintiff:
[U]nder the auction approach, [the lead plaintiff] is an
irrelevancy .... By no reasonable reading of this [statutory]
language can the Court's right to disapprove lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel be transmogrified into a right to arrange a
shot-gun marriage between strangers .... Under the approach
mandated by the Reform Act... the primary focus must always
be, not on the selection of counsel, but on the selection of lead
plaintiff."'
In a similarly-thorough analysis worth repeating in full, Judge
Wilken in Steiner v. Aurora Foods Inc.,"' articulated her belief that
competitive bidding for lead counsel cannot be reconciled with the
PSLRA:
While competitive bidding has been adopted by some district
courts as a means to select lead counsel, the majority of courts
have not adopted such an approach. Furthermore, competitive
biding appears to be contrary to the plain language of the
PSLRA, which states that the plaintiff chosen as lead plaintiff
"shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain
counsel to represent the class." The PSLRA gives the court
authority both to approve counsel selected by the lead plaintiff,
and ultimately to determine the amount of fees awarded to such
counsel. This oversight is sufficient to ensure that the interests
of the class are protected, without depriving the lead plaintiff of
its right to the counsel of its choice. Therefore, the Court
declines to adopt a competitive bidding process for the
determination of lead counsel in this case.140
136. Id. at 310.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 310-11 (citation omitted).
139. Steiner v. Aurora Foods, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20341 (N.D. Cal.
June 5, 2000).
140. Id. at *16-*17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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This lengthy discussion further supports the view that
competitive bidding is antithetical to the plain language of the
PSLRA, which was designed to include sufficient oversight to
ensure that shareholder classes are protected.
Aurora Foods also raises a new twist in the competitive-
bidding spectrum. Rather than forcing bidding on a lead plaintiff,
another plaintiff seeking appointment argued that the presumptive
lead plaintiff was inadequate for failing to use competitive bidding
to select counsel."' The court wisely rejected such an argument:
"Espinosa's arguments that the Court should adopt a competitive
bidding approach to the selection of lead counsel, and that the
presumption that the Aurora Lead Plaintiff Group is the most
adequate Plaintiff is overcome by its failure to seek competitive
bidding are unavailing." '42  Relying on the her belief that the
PSLRA does not allow for competitive bidding, Judge Wilken
"conclude[d] that the Aurora Lead Plaintiff Group's failure to seek
competitive bidding does not indicate that it will inadequately
represent the interests of the class."'' 3  This slightly different
approach to endorsing bidding was recently adopted by Judge
Walker, although not at the prompting of any of the other
potential lead plaintiffs.'" In In re Copper Mountain Networks
Securities Litigation, he held that because the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff negotiated a fee agreement that ranged from
20% to 30% of the total recovery-a percentage that he
determined was not "competitive" because of its "extravagance"-
that "the presumption invoked by the [group with the largest
financial interest] is... rebutted" and the presumptive lead
plaintiff was inadequate as a matter of law by virtue of its fee
agreement.' If followed to its logical conclusion Judge Walker's
holding that a fee agreement could render a plaintiff inadequate
under Rule 23 would mean that every class action adopting the
Ninth Circuit's benchmark of 25% would have had an inadequate
141. Id. at *16.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *17.
144. See In re Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D.
Cal. 2001), rev'd, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).
145. Id. at 489.
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class representative and would thus be neither binding nor satisfy
due process.'" This cannot be so.
At least nine other federal district courts presented with the
opportunity to adopt competitive bidding after the PSLRA have
rejected the option.' 7 Even state courts have joined the growing
chorus of bidding foes. Finding that bidding may deter counsel's
diligence, the Delaware Chancery Court in Seinfeld v. Coker,'
recognized that an auction system "may not lead to a fully
motivated class counsel, especially if the auction process has
caused counsel to discount aggressively their bid," and that
negotiated fee arrangements "may provide a superior ex ante
approach to creating the proper incentives."'
Finally, although not directly related to securities law,
competitive bidding in other areas have been struck down as
unconstitutional. In State v. Smith,'50 the Arizona Supreme Court
held that a statute requiring competitive bidding for the
representation of indigent criminal defendants violated "the right
of a defendant to due process and right to counsel as guaranteed by
146. Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that class
members who are not parties to suit are bound by judgment-and due process is
satisfied-only if absent members' interests are adequately protected by
representative class members).
147. See Sutton v. MarchFirst, Inc., 00-C-6676 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2001)
(providing for counsel to submit fee agreement to court, but implicitly rejected
suggestion of defendants to adopt competitive bidding by not doing so); In re
AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-5364 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2001) (appointing the
New Hampshire Group as lead plaintiff over defendant's suggestion of
competitive bidding); Rosenberg v. Nationsbanc Montgomery Sec. Inc., No. C-
98-20956 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1998) (appointing lead counsel without resorting to
bidding despite the request in prior pleadings of one group of plaintiffs to auction
off lead counsel position); In re IBP, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7898
(D.S.D. June 7, 2001).; In re Diamond Multimedia Sys. Sec. Litig., 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21558 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 1997); In re Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc.,
79 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, 78 F. Supp. 2d 845,
854 (S.D. Ind. 1999); In re Critical Path Sec. Litig., CV-01-0551, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11481 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2001); Hearing Transcript at 11-17, In re Calico
Commerce, 01-CV-3221 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2001).
148. Seinfeld v. Coker, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172 (Del. Dec. 4, 2000).
149. Id. at *27 n.36.
150. State v. Smith, 680 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
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the Arizona and United States Constitution."'"' Central to this
decision was the belief that bidding, when applied to legal
representation, "is the least desirable and can result in inadequate
representation by counsel."'52 Like an indigent criminal defendant
who has little choice in selecting his lawyer, the absent class
members deserve to have their interests protected by counsel
whose fees will not potentially render their representation
inadequate because the court has catered solely to the lowest fee.
Blind adherence to the promotion of competitive bidding in
securities class actions can lead to absurd results that are
antithetical to the goals of the PSLRA. For example, in once
recent case, Judge Walker instituted a competitive-bidding system
and selected lead counsel based on the bids, but could not find a
plaintiff willing to prosecute the suit with the "winning" counsel.'53
The lead plaintiff determined to be most-adequate based on
financial loss wanted to continue as lead plaintiff with his own
lawyers, but refused to work with counsel that had opposed him
earlier in the litigation.' Frustrated that his auction had not
yielded the result he had hoped it would, Judge Walker jettisoned
the lead plaintiff and- unbelievably-told the "winning" lead
counsel that they should go out and pick a new client to act as lead
plaintiff.'55 The court seemingly recognized that the case must have
a plaintiff to go forward, but appointed lead counsel without one:
"At some point or other, there is going to clearly have to be a class
representative.., you can identify and bring forward who has the
kinds of qualities and experiences and ability to discharge the
supervisory responsibilities that the Reform Act spoke
about .... ,""' Thus, in Quintus the court disregarded the PSLRA's
emphasis on empowering the lead plaintiff-thereby abandoning
the case to the lawyers -and appointed a law firm to lead a case
151. Id. at 1381.
152. Id. at 1383.
153. Hearing Transcript at 15, In re Quintus Sec. Litig., No. C-00-4263 (VRW)
(N.D. Cal. June 14, 2001) [hereinafter Quintus Transcript].
154. See id. at 16.
155. See Jason Hoppin, Attorneys Getting the Silent Treatment, THE
RECORDER, July 19, 2001, at 1.
156. Quintus Transcript, supra note 153, at 22.
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without a client. This, clearly, is not what Congress had in mind
when it sought to reform lawyer-driven litigation.157 Indeed,
"[u]nder the approach mandated by the Reform Act... the
primary focus must always be, not on the selection of counsel, but
on the selection of lead plaintiff."'58  Under the auspices of
protecting the class, the court in Quintus effectively repealed the
PSLRA by abandoning the statutory framework intended to
protect defrauded investors.
F. Competitive Bidding Is Inconsistent With the Objectives of the
PSLRA
There are many arguments as to why competitive bidding is an
inappropriate method for selecting lead counsel in securities class
actions. This analysis confines the discussion to the relationship
between competitive bidding and the PSLRA. Relevant issues
include: whether auctions deter sophisticated investors'
participation; whether bidding unduly prolongs the lead-plaintiff
selection process; whether the PSLRA's stay on discovery prevents
informed bidding; academic review of the propriety of competitive
bidding; why defendants advocate bidding; and cost-versus-quality
trade-offs.
1. Deterring Sophisticated Investors from Participation in Class
Actions
The Network Associates case discussed at the outset of this
article shows that competitive bidding can deter sophisticated
investors from participating in securities class actions. " 9 The SEC
has also recognized this possibility:
The court's resort to an auction could discourage institutions
157. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 35, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 734 ("[T]he Conference Committee expects that the plaintiff
will choose counsel rather than, as is true today, counsel choosing the plaintiff.").
158. In re Razorfish Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
159. See supra INTRODUcTION.
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from stepping forward to lead class actions. Institutions and
other large investors, whose participation Congress sought to
encourage, may understandably be reluctant to invest time and
money in selecting counsel and negotiating advantageous fee
arrangements if these actions are at risk of being overridden by
the court. Even if they are not deterred from participating, they
may find it difficult to work with unfamiliar counsel and thus
may place a less active and effective role on behalf of the
class.1 6
The Commission has also noted that the court should rely on
investors' judgment in approving the selection of counsel because
"failing to do so could enhance counsel's control of the litigation,
which is contrary to Congress'[s] intent. It could also deprive
institutional investors of a core reason for serving as lead plaintiff,
only adding to the already significant disincentives for them to do
S O .
''61
Professor Coffee, who served as legal consultant and adviser to
the White House's Office of General Counsel during the PSLRA's
consideration and passage,16 has also noted this possibility of
sophisticated-investor deterrence:
Although the PSLRA gives the court authority to veto the
choice of an unqualified class, counsel, it does not confer the
right to disregard the client's choice .... Not only does letting
the low bidder control litigation decisions maintain control in
lawyers' hands, but it may chill the willingness of...
institutional bidders to serve as lead plaintiffs, if they are to be
involuntarily wedded to counsel they did not select."'
In other words, forcing a shotgun-marriage between a
sophisticated investor and an unfamiliar counsel may drive away
the very type of lead plaintiff the PSLRA sought to encourage.
Similarly, Professor Elliott Weiss, who co-authored the article that
160. SEC Brief, supra note 103, at 2.
161. Id. at 14-15.
162. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Symposium on the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995- The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:
Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 975 (1996).
163. John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Class Auctions, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14, 1998,
at B6.
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provided the basis for the lead-plaintiff and counsel provisions,"'
has noted that the competitive-bidding process is "misguided."'65
Professor Weiss believes that such a practice will deter large
investors from participating in securities actions: "[I]f courts
develop a practice of second-guessing the considered decisions of
sophisticated institutional investors concerning which attorneys to
hire and on what terms to retain them, such institutional investors
will become even more reluctant than they are now to assume the
burdens of serving as lead plaintiffs."'66 Professor Weiss recently
submitted this opinion to the Third Circuit Task Force addressing
the selection of class counsel:
If it becomes clear that institutional investors' good faith efforts
to select and retain counsel will frequently be subjected to
judicial second guessing, it seems clear to me that fewer
institutions - and in particular, far fewer of the most responsible
and diligent institutions - will seek to plaintiffs in securities
class actions in the future .... [J]udicially conducted auctions
constitute a particularly clumsy mechanism for selecting lead
counsel is [sic] securities class actions."'
Once the selection of lead counsel has been given to the court
rather than counsel, the relationship between an institutional
investor and counsel is fundamentally altered:
[After the auction] the working relationship with lead counsel
and the supervisory role we had carved out for ourselves was
subtly but irretrievably damaged. Since we were no longer in
control of the agreement our authority over counsel was
undermined. Lead counsel was the court's choice... [and]
"ownership" of the case had been ceded to the court.168
164. S. REP. No. 104-98, at n.32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690
(citing Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16).
165. Declaration of Elliott J. Weiss 27, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., No.
1664 (D.N.J. May, 2000) [hereinafter Weiss Declaration].
166. Id. 27(a).
167. Elliott J. Weiss, Written Statement Before the Third Circuit Task Force
on Selection of Class Counsel, at 3 (Mar. 8, 2001).
168. Lona Goodman, Testimony on Behalf of the City of New York, Third
Circuit Task Force on Selection of Counsel, at 5 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter
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Deterring institutional investors is not just an abstract
possibility. Several of the nation's largest institutions have
emphasized that they will not participate in securities class actions
if competitive bidding is used. For example, the General Counsel
to the Florida State Board of Administration recently explained
that the Florida Board would never agree to a competitive bidding
regime:
We would not think of bidding out.., assignments to the low-
price bidder. Legal services are not a commodity... The FSBA
believes that auctioning class counsel is wholly inconsistent with
both the express letter and spirit of the PSLRA... [W]e would
not care to work with counsel other than that of our own
choosing, if that other counsel had prevailed in an auction
process on criteria heavily reliant on price, slighting our own
experience and judgment in identifying and working with highly
qualified law firms many times before and negotiating a fee.
Even assuming an institutional investor is willing to go along
with a competitive-bidding system, the structure of that system
may also drive away institutional investors. For example, in In re
Quintus Securities Litigation,70 the court chided the lead plaintiff
for requesting an increasing-percentage fee agreement.'
Ironically, one of the commentators relied upon by the court for
support in that case'. represents one of the nations largest pension
funds and insists on an increasing-percentage fee: "To date we have
always opted for an increasing percentage fee arrangement. I
believe that structure tends to align the interests of lead counsel
with the class and simplifies supervision of counsel as the case
progresses.""' Thus, even if an institution participates in an
Goodman Testimony].
169. Horace Chow II, General Counsel, Florida State Board of
Administration, Remarks Before Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of Class
Counsel, at 3-5 (June 1, 2001).
170. In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp.2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
171. Id. at 986-87.
172- See id. at 974 (citing Keith L. Johnson & Douglas M. Hagerman, The
Elephant in Securities Class Actions: Lessons Learned About Legal Fees, 9 CORP.
LEGAL ADVISOR 8 (2001)).
173. Written Statement of Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of
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auction and has lawyers it disagrees with forced upon it, that
institution may be further held hostage by a fee structure that it
also disagrees with.
Some argue that large, sophisticated investors have not come
forward in the volume the PSLRA drafters had hoped, and,
accordingly, the courts may step in to protect the class members by
selecting lead counsel. 4 This argument misses the point. The
PSLRA is still in its infancy and sophisticated investors are coming
forward in greater numbers."5  In late-1997 Professor Weiss
suggested that it would be another "five years or more before we
have enough data to reach more than very tentative conclusions as
to how the lead plaintiff provisions have affected the conduct of
securities class actions."'76  That time has only just arrived.
Competitive bidding does not further the PSLRA's objective that
sophisticated investors come forward to take control of cases and
ensure vigorous class representation. To step in now and
potentially force the retreat of sophisticated investors just as their
participation begins to increase would effectively nullify Congress's
intentions in drafting the PSLRA.1"
2. Bidding is Inconsistent With the PSLRA 's Strict Time
Constraints
One of the PSLRA's goals was to expedite the lead-plaintiff
and counsel selection process. The Act provides that the court
should consider motions for lead plaintiff-who in turn is to select
Wisconsin Investment Board, to Third Circuit Task Force on Selection of
Counsel, at 5 (May 5, 2001) [hereinafter Written Statement of Keith Johnson].
174. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (July 24, 1997); Joint Written
Testimony of Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Ten Things We Know
and Ten Things We Don't Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (noting that, as of mid-1997, institutional investors were not coming
forward in the volume that had been hoped for).
175. See supra notes 47, 54-56 and accompanying text.
176. Elliott J. Weiss, The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 561, 563 (1997).
177. See supra notes 47, 54-56 and accompanying text.
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lead counsel-"not later than 90 days after which notice is
published. ....","' Adding another procedural level to the process
to allow for competitive bidding will only further delay the process.
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
recognized this unattractive effect when it considered the
appropriateness of competitive bidding under the discretion given
courts by Rule 23, concluding that such a procedure "add[ed] an
undesirable layer of complexity of getting class actions initiated."''
This delay is not what Congress intended: "The PSLRA imposes
strict time requirements... The obvious intent of these provisions
is to ensure that the lead plaintiff is appointed at the earliest
possible time, and to expedite the lead plaintiff process.""18 The
Microstrategy court discussed Congress's intent that the lead-
plaintiff selection process-including selection of counsel-be
performed quickly, and that lead-plaintiff time-period limitations
were "a significant element of the statute, and reflect[] Congress's
sensible intent that the lead plaintiff be appointed as early in the
litigation as possible."18'
As demonstrated by Network Associates, the final selection of
lead plaintiff may be dependent upon the approval of lead
counsel.'82 Adding a bidding procedure into the mix likely forces
courts to take much longer than the statutorily required ninety
days to select lead plaintiff and counsel. In Oracle the court added
ten weeks to lead-counsel selection process to allow for evaluation
and submission of bids;'83 in Network Associates it took more than
eight months;" in Wenderhold v. Cylink it took almost eleven
178. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000).
179. Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Meeting Minutes (Feb. 16-17, 1995)
(emphasis added).
180. In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 818 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
181. In re Microstrategy Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 433 n.12 (E.D. Va.
2000).
182. See supra INTRODUCTION.
183. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 641 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(noting that three weeks were allocated for bid calculation and seven weeks to
consider those bids).
184. Compare In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that the first complaint was filed on April 7, 1999), with
In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21484, at *3-*4
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months from when the first complaint was filed until bidding was
completed; ' and in In re California Micro Devices Securities
Litigation, it took over a year to find lead counsel through an
unsuccessful bidding process which was eventually abandoned as
unsuccessful, with the court letting the lead plaintiff "choose class
counsel and proceed with the litigation as it s[aw] fit."'86 These
cases span a ten-year period from 1990 to 1999. In Oracle, Judge
Walker assumed that with experience, the time it takes to select
lead plaintiff and counsel under an auction system would
"considerably shorten. ... ,187 But ten years later the process, if
anything, is taking longer. Thus, the gantlet that is competitive
bidding has proven itself not only contrary to the express
provisions of the PSLRA, but also inconsistent with its intent to
expedite the process for selecting lead plaintiff and counsel in
securities class actions.
3. Inadequate Informational Base for Bidding or Accepting Bids
Lead-counsel auctions have been defended, in part, because
they allow a court to conclusively set the fee amount at the
beginning of the litigation.'88 The benefits of this argument,
although superficially appealing, are doubtful. The PSLRA
imposes a strict stay on discovery until after the court has decided a
motion to dismiss." 9 A lead-counsel auction places both plaintiff's
counsel and the court in the unenviable position of determining the
value of the case before discovery can reveal the full facts, and
before motion practice reveals the full extent of the issues. Thus,
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1999) (noting that the bids must be in by December 17, 1999).
185. See Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 582 n.3, 587 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (noting that the first notice of the complaint was published on November 6,
1998, and that bids were due to the court by September 30, 1999).
186. See In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 259, 276
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the litigation had been going on for over one year,
and that the auction had failed and thus lead plaintiff could simply choose its own
counsel).
187. Oracle, 136 F.R.D. at 641 n.4.
188. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000).
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both the bidders and the court are severely constrained in their
knowledge of the likelihood, total dollar amount, or scope of the
potential recovery. This deficiency means that some bidders will
make unknowingly unrealistic bids; this process yields what's
known as the "winner's curse"-a mis-estimation of market value.
This problem is particularly acute when a court adopts a bidding
system where class counsel gets paid only when the class obtains a
minimum settlement amount:
In short, the problem with the Court's bidding formula is that it
virtually ensures that no settlement is possible below the
[bidder's estimated value of the case]. Moreover, at least when
a large number of bidders are attracted, it becomes predictable
that one or more bidders will be either overly optimistic or will
behave as rational risk preferrer, bidding well above the
consensus of the action's worth. In other contexts this would be
only the bidder's problem, but.., the bidder who [mis-
estimates its] bid[] ... will predictably harm the class .... As a
result, the classic "winner's curse" is borne at least as much by
the class as class counsel."0
Indeed, class counsel auctions cast lawyers and the court in
roles not suited to adequate representation:
The amount of fee awarded in a class action should not be
based on a "gamble" at the beginning of the case. A class
action is not a lottery with the prize going to the counsel who
"guesses" right before all the facts are in. Auctions casts
lawyers as entrepreneurs and gamblers-not professionals
governed by a code of professional responsibility and a
fiduciary duty.'
Other scholars have similarly found that an auction systems
fails to adequately serve the class's interest because of the lack of
meaningful information available at the start of the litigation:
[T]he auction process does nothing to make reasonably
accurate information available to the lawyers for use in
190. John C. Coffee, Jr., Untangling the "Auction Houses" Aftermath, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 30, 2000, at 1.
191. Goodman Testimony, supra note 168, at 10.
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preparation of informed and well-reasoned bids .... The price
for switching from ex post to ex ante fee determinations would
therefore appear to be less informed decision-making, resulting
in the submission of bids inappropriately tailored to the claim
and the selection of a bid that may ultimately disserve the
class'[s] interests.' 92
A more balanced approach is where the court approves fees at
the conclusion of the case-as required by the statute-when it can
value the time and talent of the lead-counsel's work. 193 In fact,
under Rule 23(e) a class action cannot be settled without "approval
of the court," and even courts using bidding have recognized that
"auctions do not obviate the Court's final review of fees pursuant
to Rule 23(e)."' 9 Further, with the information obtained during
the course of the litigation, the court will have a much better sense
of the value of the case, the amount of risk involved, and the skill
demonstrated by class counsel. For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recently noted that a district court "abuses its
discretion by not exercising" it in applying specific factors for
evaluating fee awards.' 95 Those factors include:
the presence of absence of substantial objections by members of
the class to the settlement terms and/or fees requested by
counsel ... the skill an efficiency of the attorneys involved...
the complexity and duration of the litigation.., the amount of
time devoted to the case by plaintiffs' counsel, and... the
awards in similar cases.196
Significantly, none of these factors can be considered when the
fee is set at the litigation's outset.
192. Andrew K. Niebler, Review: In Search of Bargained for Fees for Class
Action Plaintiffs' Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of
Lead Counsel, 54 Bus. LAW. 763, 776-77 (1999).
193. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6).
194. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 152; see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court....").
195. In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 4246, at *30 (3d
Cir. 2001).
196. Id. at *30-*31 (citing Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190,
195 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000)).
2003]
404 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
Because the court will be the final arbiter of fees at the
litigation's conclusion-with the benefit of a full record and
knowledge of the result-and because lead plaintiffs now generally
rely on market forces in selecting from qualified counsel,197 it is
unnecessary to institute bidding to achieve the same result.
Moreover, all interested parties have traditionally had the right to
object and address the fee petition at a settlement or fairness
hearing.'98 This hearing is one of the few opportunities where a
client-under the PSLRA, class members and lead plaintiff-is
able to carefully reflect upon the performance of its lawyers by
presenting to the court their position concerning any fee award.
Competitive bidding would destroy this right and force the class to
accept whatever fees the bidding lawyers have set out, even if an
after-the-fact analysis shows the fees to be unreasonable.
Further, while judges adopting bidding systems have noted
that "a court's expertise is rarely at its most formidable in the
evaluation of counsel fees,"'99 this observation begs the question
whether the court's expertise is any better at evaluating bids which
may differ dramatically in sophistication and complexity, before
any of the case's facts are available.
Judges are neither economists, statisticians, nor fortune-tellers;
their jobs are difficult enough without forcing these additional
roles upon them: "appraising the qualities of bids requires
sophistication;... [bids] vary, and selections require tradeoffs that
in turn demand value-laden evaluations .... Judges are not
surrogate clients,... [r]ather,... judges have a host of difficult
regulatory choices to make. No mechanism exists that reduces the
task to a simple equation. . . ."'0 Indeed, Professor Miller recently
197. The SEC has indicated that market forces have had an effect on lead
plaintiff's selection of counsel. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of the General Counsel, Report to the President and the Congress on the
First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, at 63, n.231 (Apr. 1997).
198. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions,
148 F.3d 283, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1998).
199. Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. at 150.
200. Judith Resnik et al., Aggregation and Individual Justice: Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv.
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made this same point to the Third Circuit Task Force: "One must
ask whether one of the system's most precious and limited
resources-judicial time-is better expended in running
competitive bidding regimes or devoted to other, more judicial,
matters."2 "1 The Supreme Court has long cautioned that a judge's
role should be limited to judging, rather than trying to resolve
issues they are ill-equipped to handle: "Judges, after all, are
human. They, no less than others in our society, have a natural
tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often
intractable problems are better and more workable than those of
the persons who are actually charged with" making those
decisions.2"
In Oracle, the court eschewed quality as a meaningful factor
and reduced the task of fee assessment to the simple equation of
the cheapest fee, yet provided no insight as to why price alone
dictates a -reasonable fee that is not "too good" to be true.' 3
Scholars have commented on the judicial dogma associated with
divining the correct bid by noting that "courts have assumed too
glibly that they know which bid is best."2 4 Even Judge Walker has
noted that "judges are poorly suited to determine reasonable fees
.... Judges who believe that they have any special expertise on this
subject are simply fooling themselves (but probably no one
else)."2 5 One must wonder if judges who employ bidding systems
are also "simply fooling" themselves into believing that they can
determine what constitutes a reasonable bid. In approving the
winning bid in Oracle, Judge Walker justified it, in part, on the
ground that the fee "was not out of line with that produced by
296, 389 (1996); Cf. In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d. 780,
785 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that the court is called upon to act as "surrogate
client" for the class).
201. Written Statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Submitted to the Third Circuit Task
Force on the Selection of Class Counsel, at 22 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter Written
Statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller].
202. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979).
203. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 547 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
204. Coffee Jr., supra note 163, at B6.
205. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 695-96 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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other fee regimes. 20 6 Because the fee structure was "consistent
with amounts courts have found appropriate," Judge Walker held
that the fee was consistent with existing Ninth Circuit standards of
reasonable compensation. 7  If the lengthy process that is
competitive bidding yields fees that are the same as traditional
regimes of fee calculation, then why bother with it?
4. Academic Review of Competitive Bidding
It appears that every academic who has submitted an affidavit
to a court considering bidding has rejected mandatory court-
ordered bidding for the selection of lead counsel.2 8 For example,
Stanford Law School professor-and former SEC Commissioner-
Joseph Grundfest has observed that "a court mandated bidding
process appears, on its face, to be inconsistent with the statutory
language [of the PSLRA] which suggests that lead counsel is to be
selected by the lead plaintiff, not by the court, and then subject to
judicial review.""2 9 Grundfest has also stated that such a system "is
fundamentally at odds with Congressional intent and with the clear
language of the [PSLRA]."'21
Fordham Law School professor Jill Fisch, who has written
extensively in the area of securities class actions,21' notes that,
"[a]lthough the auction procedure has some theoretical appeal, the
206. Oracle, 132 F.R.D. at 547.
207. Id. at 547-48.
208. Some of those academics, however, have observed that, despite their
inconsistency with the PSLRA, auctions are one method of ameliorating agency
concerns in class actions where there is evidence that the lead plaintiff will fail to
closely monitor class counsel. See Declaration of Joseph Grundfest Regarding
Procedures Employed in the Selection of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel
Pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 4, Aronson v.
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. C-99-20743-RMW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 1999).
209. Id. 27.
210. Id. 34.
211. See Jill Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of
Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1999);
Jill Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIz. L.
REv. 533 (1997); Jill Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the
Plaintiff, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997).
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difficulties in designing and implementing an appropriate auction
make it an inappropriate tool for selecting and compensating lead
counsel. An auction does not simulate the market process for
selection of counsel.,22 Likewise, Professor Weiss recently noted
in the Cendant case that competitive bidding did not lead to the
best fee arrangement for the class, and that "the Court's decision
[to] select[] the 'lowest qualified bid' [in Cendant] ... illustrates
some of the perils of a judicially mandated and controlled auction
process. 2
1 1
Harvard Law School's Lucian A. Bebchuk, Professor of Law,
Economics, and Finance, has also rejected bidding, because
"competitive bidding would be inconsistent with the PSLRA's goal
of strengthening the role of lead plaintiff in two ways-first,
because it would diminish the role of chosen lead plaintiffs, and,
second, because it would discourage potentially valuable lead
plaintiffs from coming forward to serve in that capacity., 214
Finally, Professor Coffee, who has specifically acknowledged
that he "do[es] not believe the PSLRA contemplates the use of
auction procedures,""2 ' rejects an auction which forces counsel
upon a client:
In my judgment, this ["subject to the approval of the court"]
language has a two-edged significance: the court can veto any
counsel it considers unqualified, but it cannot mandate the
choice of counsel .... The legislative history to the PSLRA
clearly indicates a desire to increase client control, and
minimize lawyer control, of securities class actions. In that
light, although the court can veto [lead plaintiff's choice], any
attempt to impose an attorney on an unwilling institutional
client would amount to a forced "shotgun marriage" that the
PSLRA simply does not authorize or contemplate.
216
212. Affidavit of Jill E. Fisch 46, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 00-
Civ.-0648 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2000) [hereinafter Fisch Affidavit].
213. Weiss Declaration, supra note 165, 27(e).
214. Declaration of Lucian A. Bebchuk 44, Costaldo v. Microstrategy Inc.,
No. 00-CV-00473 (E.D. Va. June 1, 2000).
215. Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr. 8, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,
n.1, 98-CV-1664 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 1998).
216. Id. 18(F).
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This consistent condemnation of mandatory competitive
bidding by academics weighs heavily against forcing it on lead
plaintiffs. One must wonder why courts continue to employ it.
One suggestion is docket management: "The real driving force
behind [some court's] affinity for the class counsel auction...
appears to be a more self-interested effort to reduce the amount of
judicial time it takes to monitor and administer large class action
cases .... ,217 Docket-clearing measures, while beneficial to the
court, are of doubtful benefit to the class."8 Perhaps the SEC
recognized this sentiment best, when it wrote: "It is not sufficient
justification for a court-ordered auction, that the court merely
prefers a process that it, rather than the lead plaintiff, controls, or
assumes that an auction is inherently superior to a negotiated
agreement.""2 9
G. Why Defendants Suggest Competitive Bidding
Defendants occasionally suggest competitive bidding22 for the
selection of plaintiff's lead counsel.22' But are they so altruistic as
to seek the highest quality representation for the class that is bent
on holding them liable for potentially billions of dollars in
217. Lowell E. Sachnoff & Jeffrey T. Gilbert, Auctioning the Role of Lead
Counsel in Class Action Cases to the Lowest Bidder, ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY
MATERIALS § I.A. (July 1997).
218. See In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 692 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
219. SEC Brief, supra note 103, at 23.
220. The overwhelming majority of courts addressing this issue have held that
defendants lack standing to object or be heard on a lead plaintiff's motion for
approval of counsel. See, e.g., Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) ("The statute is clear, only potential plaintiffs may be heard regarding
the appointment of a Lead Plaintiff."); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 57, 60 (D. Mass. 1996) ("[T]he issue is one over which only potential
plaintiffs may be heard."); Takeda v. Turbodyne Techs., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1138 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("[D]efendants lack standing to object to the adequacy or
typicality of the proposed lead plaintiffs at this preliminary stage of the
litigation.").
221. See, e.g., In re AT&T Corp. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-5364 (D.N.J. Jan. 29,
2001) (appointing the New Hampshire Group as lead plaintiff over defendant's
suggestion of competitive bidding).
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damages? Not likely., Judge Hillman in Ballan v. Upjohn122 noted
that defense counsel queries into opposing counsel's adequacy
should be taken "with a grain of salt. Unless the practice of law
has changed dramatically since I was in practice, I never knew a
defense lawyer who wasn't always delighted if opposing counsel
was inexperienced, incompetent and perhaps less than adequate to
the task."2 The Seventh Circuit has also recognized the dangers of
giving defendants a voice in the selection of plaintiffs counsel-to
do so is like "permitting a fox.., to take charge of the chicken
house," and manifests nothing more than defendants' desire to
"not be successfully sued by anyone."224 It is more likely true that
defendants and their lawyers are not altruistic, but rather seek a
less experienced, less competent, or financially constrained
adversary to do battle with. A competitive-bidding system assumes
that logical class members believe minimizing fees will maximize
their overall success in the litigation. The same logic should be
equally ascribed to defendants to understand why competitive
bidding fails to benefit the class:
[O]ne can safely assume that in most cases a rational defendant,
if forced to choose [counsel for plaintiffs], would take its
chances on whichever law firm submitted the lowest bid (on the
theory that the best plaintiffs' lawyers logically would expect to
command some premium for their superior abilities). If a
defendant instinctively is likely to prefer to litigate against the
lower bidding plaintiffs' law firms, what does that say about the
wisdom of equating low auction bids with the best interests of
class members?2
Indeed, Professor Coffee recently commented that defendants
would obviously be in favor of a system which has limited controls
on the quality of bidding lawyers and simultaneously constrains the
winners financially: "defense counsel would find nothing more
attractive to it than an auction which awarded the control of a class
222. Ballan v. Upjohn, 159 F.R.D. 473 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
223. Id. at 487.
224. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union, 657 F.2d 890,
895 (7th Cir. 1981).
225. Written Statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller, supra note 201, at 27.
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action to the lowest bidder in a selection process that had relatively
little controls on... quality .... That is the field day for defense
counsel using that kind of auction technique." '226
By focusing primarily on lead-counsel's fee, the bidding
process perverts the valuation of lawyering skills. It is unfair to
afford defendants an opportunity to select the highest caliber of
counsel regardless of fees, yet deny class-action plaintiffs facing the
PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements that same chance:
[D]efendants in class-action litigation do not select their counsel
solely on price. They have a myriad of considerations of which
price is but one factor. Judging from the quality and cost of class-
action defense counsel, price is not even a particularly important
factor and is far outweighed by ... quality.'
By attempting to "'protect' the class by denying them the
ability to enter into 'expensive' contracts for legal services," courts
ignore that "such paternalism... permit[s] the defendants to
purchase more costly legal services than can the plaintiffs, thereby
eroding the deterrent potential of private law enforcement."2 " Put
simply, the class should be allowed the same right to choose the
best, rather than the cheapest, counsel.
Competitive bidding gives defendants an unfair advantage in
any prolonged litigation; to understand why this is, imagine the
uproar defendants would raise if the court forced them to adopt it.
One pension fund recently did:
In my view, the plaintiff class should be put in the same stead
regarding the selection of counsel as defendants .... One might
ask, when a judge directly selects class counsel for the plaintiffs
through a bidding process, shouldn't fairness require the
defendants to under go the same process?... [T]he plaintiff
class should be afforded a level of integrity in the selection of
226. Coffee Testimony, supra note 122, at 30.
227. Jay W. Eisenhofer & Cynthia A. Calder, Fee Auctions: Are Courts Selling
Out the Class to the Lowest Bidder?, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March 30,
2001, at 5.
228. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on
Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 636 (1987).
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lead counsel similar to what the defendants enjoy.229
To date, no court has ordered defendants to open their
counsel-selection process to competitive bidding.
Lest defendants be convinced that auctions are a panacea to
securities-fraud claims, they should know that this competitive
advantage in prolonged litigation may hurt them in the initial
pleading stages. This is because, despite the heightened pleading
standards of the PSLRA-intended to weed-out more cases at the
motion-to-dismiss stage-every case where a court has adopted
competitive bidding has survived the motion to dismiss. It is quite
possible that after having invested so much time and energy into
the selection of class counsel through the use of an auction, courts
are far less likely to throw that work away by dismissing the case a
few weeks later.
Competitive bidding presents an even greater danger if
plaintiffs' firms are less willing to accept cases-or less willing to
investigate in fear of wasting time and money-for fear of losing
control of the case to a competing firm that seeks to ride on the
coat-tails of the investigating firm."0 Indeed, part of the impetus
behind the PSLRA was that prior to its enactment, "Courts often
afford[ed] insufficient consideration to the most thoroughly
researched... complaint."'" The result then, will be less
sophisticated-investor involvement, less investigation, less redress,
and more fraud-a result no published decision has discussed.
Less investigation of securities fraud conflicts with the Supreme
Court's recognition that private enforcement of securities fraud is
the "most effective weapon in the enforcement of the securities
laws and are a necessary supplement to [SEC] action." 2  Any
practice that discourages sophisticated investors from serving as
lead plaintiff and endangers thorough investigation of fraud is
229. Written Statement of Keith Johnson, supra note 173, at 3.
230. See Three Crown Ltd. P'ship v. Caxton Corp., 817 F. Supp. 1033, 1040
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Plaintiffs cannot be permitted to free ride off... [of] the
complaints of other parties filing similar lawsuits .... ).
231. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-69, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 732.
232. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985).
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antithetical to the PSLRA's goals. Auctions do both.
The investigation of securities fraud is expensive, especially in
light of the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements.33
Attempting to properly calculate an appropriate bid for a major
securities-fraud class action adds further expense. Every cent
spent on investigation and bid calculation is wasted if the
investigating firm is underbid. The investigating firm must then
factor that expense into its bid, whereas a competing firm-which
has the benefit of the already filed complaint to work from-does
not, and thus can proffer lower bids, thereby increasing its chances
of being selected as lead counsel. Professor Coffee refers to this as
"claim jumping," and notes that auctions will thus "reduce[] the
incentive to search [for fraud]." 4 He adds, somewhat poetically,
that class-counsel auctions "permit the original prospector who
discovered the violation of law, maybe after much work, off there
in those lonely desert hills where he found the law in violation, to
suddenly have his claim jumped by the [winning] bidder." 5
Higher-quality firms will have less incentive to incur and write-off
the lost time and opportunity costs necessary to prepare a bid,
because they realize their efforts will not be rewarded if the non-
investigating firms consistently win the auction. The costs don't
always end at the bidding preparation stage. For example, in In re
Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, the court failed to select a
winning bid at the time defendants moved to dismiss the case, and
thus ordered all nine bidding firms to research and draft an
opposition to the motion to dismiss, thereby adding an
unrecoverable expense to all but one of the bidding firms. 6 This
process results in the "lemon" problem: high-quality firms are
unwilling to incur bidding costs to enter an unwinnable auction,
leaving the court to select from a motley crew of "lemon"
233. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
234. Outline of Testimony by Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolph A Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, before the Third Circuit Task Force on
the Selection of Class Counsel, at 7 (May 5, 2001) [hereinafter Coffee Outline].
235. Coffee Testimony, supra note 122, at 38.
236. In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6027, at
*5 (N.D. I11. Mar. 14, 2001).
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lawyers." Judge Walker seemingly recognized this fact in Oracle,
where he noted that "uncertainty about compensation affects not
only the litigation at hand, but also incentives in future roughly
comparable cases."'" In fact, Judge Walker has commented on the
lack of competition among some of the auctions he has held. 9 He
attributes this lack of competition to "collaboration among plaintiff
firms engaged in securities class action litigation ... ."* A less
sinister rationale is more likely, however, as one former Third
Circuit judge recently noted:
[T]he lower fee awards in auctioning cases seems to have
caused many of the law firms that specialize in class actions to
become reluctant participants, or 'gun shy,' and to choose not to
participate in auctions. Many such firms have found the risk of
investing a substantial amount of time and expense in
investigating and developing claims is simply too great, in light
of the statistical probability that they will lose in the bidding
process and go uncompensated for pre-bid work. The costs
associated with this process appear to be an expense these firms
are not willing to sustain. 241
This competitive-bidding process thus yields less investigation
and recovery for corporate fraud, which contradicts the very
purpose of the securities laws "to protect investors and to maintain
confidence in the securities markets, so that out national savings,
capital formation[,] and investment may grow for the benefit of all
Americans."24
Does a system that deters the investigation of fraud better
237. See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
238. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citation
omitted).
239. See In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11587, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1995).
240. Id.
241. Statement by Arlin M. Adams in Response to "Questions to be
Addressed by Third Circuit Task Force on Appointment of Counsel in Class
Actions" (on file with author).
242. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730.
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serve the public interest? No. Competitive bidding may not only
harm class members in any particular action, but may also
indirectly harm investors and undermine investor confidence by
severely diminishing the incentive to thoroughly investigate
securities fraud. This analysis shows competitive bidding to be
"penny-wise and pound foolish." With fewer fraud actions being
brought, the incentive to commit fraud will increase, as will the
harm done to investors and the securities markets as a whole.
1. The Cost v. Quality Trade-Off
Another relevant consideration in examining the effects of
competitive bidding is whether the reduction in fees yields a
concomitant reduction in quality of representation. One scholar
recently discussed this trade-off:
[Courts] incorrectly assign[] an equal probability of achieving
each level of recovery regardless of the requested attorneys'
fees. In other words, [courts] fail[] to take into account the
dynamic interaction between the investment incentives created
by attorneys' fees and the probability of certain levels of
recovery. Consider the following hypothetical: Firm A seeks
15% of the first $30 million of recovery in a class action, and
Firm B asks for 30% of the same amount. Based on a static
analysis, Firm A would be the obvious choice of the plaintiff
class because its fee would increase the class recovery by $4.5
million for the first $30 million. However, because Firm A will
rationally invest only half the resources that Firm B will invest,
on average Firm A will be less likely to recover the $30 million.
If, for instance, Firm B's additional investment increased the
chance of success from 60% to 75%, the plaintiff class would
clearly prefer Firm B. Although the attorneys would take a
larger share, the expected recovery is sufficiently greater to
increase the net recovery for the plaintiff class. In other words,
the competitive pressure on prices that the lead counsel auction
creates will not always increase the plaintiffs' net recovery, as the
courts have assumed. 243
243. Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation: V. Class
Auctions: Market Models for Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Litigation, 113
HARV. L. REv. 1827, 1842 (May 2000) (emphasis added).
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In simpler terms, 70% of something is substantially better than
85% of nothing.
Professor Coffee has also discussed this cost-versus-quality
trade-off when he reviewed the auction in Cendant, reaching a
similar conclusion while emphasizing the significance of the quality
of representation:
Competitive bidding ignores the cost/quality tradeoff to which
most clients are very sensitive. If you were facing heart surgery
tomorrow, it is unlikely that you would hire the heart surgeon
who submitted the lowest bid. Nor is the cheapest lawyer
usually the best. Although competitive bidding is used in many
contexts, it works best when the goods or services being
auctioned are fungible or objectively verifiable. Litigation
services are, however, more intangible. To date, courts have
responded to this point by ruling that only "qualified" law firms
would be permitted to bid. This response sidesteps the critical
point that there is a wide margin between "qualified" and
"excellent."244
Columbia University Law School professor Samuel Issacharoff
makes a similar point by observing that a bidding system may
inspire unscrupulous lawyers to proffer low bids in many cases to
create a cache of cheap settlements with little work involved:
As with dentistry, there may be some pain associated with
delivering yourself to professionals whose chief attribute is their
willingness to work you over cheaply .... If we may assume
that the interests of the absent class members consist chiefly in
maximizing the return for the prosecution of their claims, there
is no reason to believe that the lowest percentage bidder can
realize that goal. The lowest percentage bidder may simply be
lawyers with lesser overhead, lesser ambition, or volume
discounters.245
Professor Miller, discussing Professor Issacharoff's concern
over "volume discounters" under an auction system, agrees that
244. Coffee, supra note 163, at B6 (emphasis added).
245. Professor Samuel Issacharoff, Columbia Law School, Comments for the
Task Force on Selection of Class Counsel, at 4 (May 5, 2001).
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competitive bidding may result in meager settlements at a systemic
level:
Creating incentives for 'volume discounters' to settle uncertain
cases early and cheaply may simply substitute a large number of
small windfalls for the far less infrequent large fee 'windfall'
attributed to non-auction approaches. ..- the only difference
being that class members are usually much better served by the
skilled lawyer who is willing to take greater risks in exchange
for greater rewards.1
46
Similarly, Professor Grundfest has emphasized that "a lead
plaintiff can responsibly conclude that a law firm's skill and
expertise relative to other bidding law firms is such that the class
can expect to attain a higher net recovery even if it agrees to pay a
higher fee."2 7 Beyond these well-reasoned opinions, the Supreme
Court recognizes that experience and skill yield higher rates for
counsel, and are not fungible goods: "We recognize, of course, that
determining an appropriate 'market rate' for the services of a
lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and
most services are determined by supply and demand. In this
traditional sense there is no such thing as a prevailing market rate
for the service of lawyers. 248 Even Judge Walker seemingly
recognized that market forces are better determined by clients than
courts, when he stated that "'[m]arkets know market values better
than judges do." 249
There is a trade-off between the odds of success and the
amount of money paid for that success. In fact, at least four courts
have endorsed the view that a judge breaches his fiduciary duty to
the class if he appoints counsel willing to work at the low-end of
the contingent spectrum.
246. Written Statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller, supra note 201, at 18.
247. See Grundfest Declaration, supra note 208, 11.
248. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n. 1, 898 (1984).
249. In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 489 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992)), rev'd,
306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).
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[Tihe big difference is in my experience in the amount obtained
[for the class] and you don't get the highest recovery when you
are paying at the low end of the scale of fee recovery in
contingent actions. It seems to me that I as the protector of the
class can fairly say, and honestly say, that I believe it is in the
class's best interests-of this class and future classes yet
unknown-to pay this kind of money for these kind of
benefits.2
°
It is inconsistent for judges professing to protect the interests
of the absent class members to not consider the financial realities
behind lower bids. Those realities dictate that the result often will
be a lower chance of recovery, which further results in less redress
for corporate fraud. These results reveal a major shortcoming of
competitive bidding-early and cheap settlements.
IV. THE PREDICTABLE RESULTS OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING:
MARGINAL RECOVERY
Even assuming the nonexistence of the PSLRA's textual and
legislative instruction that the lead plaintiff-and only the lead
plaintiff-select and retain counsel, the recovery garnered by the
"winning" lawyers in the few cases where bidding was employed
militates against its future use. Professor Coffee has noted that,
thus far, auctions don't seem to benefit the class financially:
"[E]xperience with auctions suggests... that there is a serious ...
problem: In practice, they reveal a marked tendency to result in
early, cheap settlements well below the litigation value of the
action.''" Thus far, only six cases that have used competitive
bidding have settled .1 2 With the exception of Wells Fargo-where
250. In re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting In re Pepsico Sec. Litig., No. 82-Civ-8403, at 17-18
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1985) (awarding 25% contingent fee)); In re MDC Holdings
Sec. Litig., No. CV 89-0090, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15488, at *30-*31 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 30, 1990) (quoting same); Mashburn v. National Health Care , Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 679, 687 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (quoting same).
251. Coffee, supra note 163, at B6.
252- See In re Oracle Sec Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990); In re
Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Cox v. Work Recovery,
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the attorneys appointed had prosecuted the case for more than
three years to both the Ninth Circuit 3 and the Supreme Court'
(and thus had no possibility of an early settlement) 55-these cases
uniformly demonstrate that competitive bidding is detrimental to
the class.
For example, in Oracle, the winning bid followed a "declining
percentage of the recovery" formula, which decreases the
percentage of attorney fees with the increase in the recovery. 6
The bid imposed a $325,000 cap on the litigation expenses
chargeable to the class, and included a 20% discount if the
settlement was reached within one year."' Predictably, the
recovery in Oracle was dictated by the incentive scheme fostered
by the bid structure. The case settled after one year for $25
million, at exactly the point when the expenses incurred reached
$320,065.95.258 That settlement was reached almost immediately
after the time for the 20% discount had expired, and within $5,000
of the expense cap, which implies that the decision to settle was
dictated by counsel's incentive to maximize its fees and reduce its
exposure to expenses, rather than the best interests of the class.
Inc. CIV-95-538 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 1995); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182
F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Network Associates Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp.
2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Bank One Shareholders Class Action Litig., 96 F.
Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
253. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1993).
254. In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 513 U.S. 917 (1994).
255. See Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. at 468-77 (discussing the use of
competitive bidding and noting that the Lieff Cabraser law firm had successfully
appealed the case's dismissal); see also In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20567 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 1991). For the sake of completeness, it is
worth noting that the total damages in Wells Fargo were estimated at $162
million. See Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Final
Settlement Approval at 7, In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., No. C-91-1944 (N.D. Cal.
March 29, 1995). The case settled for $13.5 million. See Paul Elias, Walker
Knocks BASF Windfall in Class Action, RECORDER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1. Thus,
the case settled for approximately 8.3% of the total damages and class counsel
obtained approximately 21.5% of the recovery. Id. (noting that the class received
$10.6 million of the $13.5 million settlement).
256. Oracle Sec Litig., 132 F.R.D. at 541-42.
257. See id.
258. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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But although the Oracle settlement appears to have been severely
influenced by the bid structure, the settlement itself was
respectable."O This is not a total surprise, though, as counsel ended
up getting "22.5% of the total settlement fund," an amount
consistent with the Ninth Circuit's benchmark.26 Ironically, this
22.5% attorney award in Oracle is within the same range that
Judge Walker deemed unreasonable as a matter of law in Copper
Mountain.26' Hence, had the plaintiff in Oracle come forward with
the same "winning" fee structure in Copper Mountain, Judge
Walker would have rejected him outright because any fee
agreement that ranges between 20% to 30% "cannot meet the
adequacy requirement the PSLRA and FRCP 23(a)(4). ' 26 2
Regardless of the relative merits of the $25 million settlement, the
fact that counsel miraculously settled the case within $5,000 of the
expense cap indicates a universal truth inherent to capped fee
structures: plaintiffs had no incentive to further prosecute a case
when they would be paying for any additional recovery in
unrecoverable expenses. This limitation will always be detrimental
to the class.
Another pre-PSLRA bidding case worth mentioning is Cox v.
Work Recovery Inc.263 In Cox, the judge conducted an auction for
class counsel because he believed it was "the best arrangement for
reasonable compensation of counsel," and that the process
"protects against lawyer windfalls ... without complicated fee
litigation" after the settlement." The court selected a firm which
targeted a $10 million recovery; counsel was to receive 20% if the
class recovered under that amount, and 15% if over.265 That $10
million target proved chimerical. Once the case began to take
259. Id. at 1459 (obtaining 24.5% of the total damages of $102 million).
260. Id. at 1458.
261. See In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 488 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that because of the "extravagance" of the 20% to 30% fee
proposed, the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate that it has negotiated a reasonably
competitive fee arrangement."), rev'd, 306 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2002).
262. Id.
263. Cox v. Work Recovery, Inc., CIV-95-538 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 1995).
264. Id. at 4-5.
265. See id. at 3-4.
2003] 419
420 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
longer than expected, class counsel cut their losses and gave the
class a settlement of less than $61,000, despite knowing that actual
damages were in excess of $52 million. 66  This amounts to a
recovery of approximately 1/10th of 1%.
In what may be the biggest securities-fraud class action in
history, the court in In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation
conducted a particularly ill-suited bidding process.267 In that case,
when the public pension-fund lead plaintiffs asked the court to
appoint the counsel they had selected, the court refused to do so,
concluding that a competitive bidding process was necessary to "to
simulate the free market in the selection of counsel.""26  Rather
than protect the absent class members, however, that auction "led
to a windfall for the successful bidders. The court ignored the fact
that the public pension fund lead plaintiffs had already conducted a
competitive bidding process in their choice of lead counsel ..."'
Within two years of the auction, the case settled and the firm with
the winning bid received $262 million under the court-ordered
bidding system 7" Under the original retainer agreement
negotiated by the pension funds, the fees would have been only
$186 million.27 Hence, "the Cendant court's well-intentioned
auction cost the class $76 million., 272
In In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 273 the court
266. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Authorizing Distribution of the Net Settlement
Fund at 2, Cox v. Work Recovery, Inc. CV-95-538-TUC-ACM (D. Ariz. Feb. 29,
2000). The $52 million figure is derived from claim forms that were actually sent
in; this damages total assumes that every class member sent in a form. It is
extremely doubtful that every class member returned a claim form and thus, the
total damages are probably much greater than $52 million.
267. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 151 (D.N.J. 1998).
268. Id. at 150.
269. See Eisenhofer & Calder, supra note 227.
270. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 285, 304 (D.N.J.
2000).
271. Id.
272. See Eisenhofer & Calder, supra note 227.
273. In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
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conducted an auction for the selection of class counsel.27 ' The bids
varied in structure so that some bids provided a better recovery at
one settlement amount, but not another; in evaluating the nine
bids, the court recognized that "because of the existence and
differing amounts of several cross-over points of [the] bids... it
[was] necessary.., to make some assumptions about the prospects
of recovery for the class."275 In making those assumptions the court
concluded that "the best-informed" estimates of potential class
recovery "appear[] to be in the $4.6 to $4.8 billion range." '276 The
judge then selected one bid over all others because he determined
that the cross-over points in the various bids "drop out of
significance" because, under the bids submitted, the cross-over
only made a difference at a percentage of recovery of 1.5 % or
less- approximately $67.5 million.277 The judge in Bank One
determined that a recovery of only 1.5% was "so far below
anything that experience teaches" that he had no problem rejecting
bids that would only help that class in the event of such a paltry
recovery.27 Unfortunately for the class, experience has now taught
that bidding can result in precisely the cheap settlement that the
court thought impossible. The Bank One court recently approved
a preliminary settlement of approximately $45 million-less than
1% of the estimated recovery, with attorney fees comprising $2.75
million, or approximately 6% of the recovery.2 79 Thus, competitive
bidding saved the class approximately $12 million in fees,' yet cost
the class potentially $4.5 billion in recovery. Once class counsel
surpassed their maximum potential fee award, they had little
incentive to pursue the case further. Such results are a testament
274. Id. at 784 (noting that a bidding system was adopted and that "best
informed" estimates of class recovery ranged between $4.6 to $4.8 billion).
275. Id. at 788. Cross-over points are the points at which differing bids are
better for the class depending on the stage of the litigation.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See In re Bank One S'holders Class Actions, No. 00-C-880, Ex. A, at 1, 3
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2001).
280. This figure is derived by taking the difference between 33% of the
recovery-the highest amount usually awarded in securities class actions-and
the 6% awarded.
2003]
422 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
to the impotence of competitive bidding.
Coming full-circle, the Network Associates case recently
settled for $30 million.28' While this award sounds impressive, it is
anything but. One of the firms associated with the original lead
plaintiff -the .Board of Pensioners of the City of Philadelphia-
performed a damages analysis at the start of the litigation and
determined that the total recoverable damages were approximately
$1.6 billion.282 Indeed, one lead plaintiff movant by itself lost $4
million more than the entire class-wide settlement. 3 The case
settled for less than 2% of its projected value, thus saving the class
approximately 25% in attorney fees at the expense of 98% of the
recovery.2" Such meager results speak for themselves.
Competitive bidding for the selection of lead counsel in
securities class actions simply does not work. Indeed, comparing
the relative recoveries in Oracle and Bank One, it appears that the
lower the contingent fee agreement, the lower the recovery tends
to be as compared to total recoverable damages. In Quintus, Judge
Walker relied on a recent study of securities class action
settlements to evaluate potential bids.8  That study provides
average settlement-to-investor-loss ratios for different levels of
losses. 286 Looking at all six bidding cases that have settled, and
comparing those settlements to the average settlement-to-loss ratio
for their respective loss levels, competitive bidding can be shown to
have cost class members more than $240 million over the last ten
281. See In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., No. C-99-001729 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
28, 2001).
282. See Damages Analysis for Network Associates, Inc. by Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach (Dec. 1999) (on file with author).
283. See In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (noting that one group of lead-plaintiff movants lost at least
$33,929,308).
284. See Network Assocs. Sec. Litig. No. C-99-001729 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2001) (noting that the attorney fees were 7% of the recovery).
285. In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 2001)
(citing Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action Settlements: An Empirical
Analysis (Nov. 16, 2000), available at
http://securities2.stanford.edu/research/studies/20001116_SSRNBajaj.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2002)).
286. See Bajaj, supra note 285, at 24, table 7A.
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years.'
Professors Weiss and Beckerman, when they drafted the lead-
plaintiff provisions, correctly observed that "auctions... are
unlikely to provide class members with adequate compensation
when their claims are meritorious." '  The real problem with
competitive bidding lies in attempting to define the why it is
needed: "Do courts want to adopt a fee formula that is likely to
maximize the net recovery to the class? Or, do they want to adopt
a formula that protects them from public criticism?" 9  Courts
287. See id. This figure is extremely conservative and derived from table 7A of
the Bajaj study, supra note 285, and the materials referred to in the above text,
and was calculated as follows: (1) the Bank One case had estimated damages of
$4.6 billion, which should have resulted in a settlement of 4.25% of that amount,
or $195.5 million. The actual settlement was only $45 million; thus, bidding in
that case cost the class members $150.5 million; (2) the Network Associates case
had estimated damages of $1.6 billion, and thus, should also have resulted in a
settlement of 4.25%, or $68 million. In fact, the case settled for $30 million; thus
bidding cost the class $38 million; (3) In the Cox case, the claim forms that were
actually sent in showed losses of $52 million. These damages should have yielded
a settlement of 7.87%, or $4.1 million. The case actually settled for $61,000, thus
costing the class approximately $4 million; (4) in Cendant, because we know the
difference in result from the bidding versus non-bidding fee, we have definitive
evidence that bidding cost the class $76 million; (5) in Oracle, the total damages
were approximately $102 million, and thus the settlement should have been
around 4.25%, or $4.3 million, and thus the class ended up above average by
around $21 million, which off-sets the losses of the other cases (but still appears
to have been limited by the expense cap in place); and (6) in Wells Fargo (an
atypical case in that bidding took place after the case had been successfully
appealed to the Ninth Circuit and years after it was filed), the total damages were
approximately $162 million, and thus the settlement should have been 4.25%, or
$6.9 million. The case settled for $13.5 million, and thus the class benefitted
more than usual by $6.6 million. Taken in concert, the entire universe of
competitive-bidding settlements appears to have cost the collective class
members $241 million: ([$150.5+$38+$4+$76] - [$21+$6.6] = $240.9 million). To
demonstrate the conservative nature of this calculation it is worth noting that had
the overall average loss-to-settlement ratio of 16.6% been used for the same
figures above-as was done by Judge Walker in Quintus, see 148 F. Supp2d 967,
985-competitive bidding would appear to cost the collective class members
$1,044,070,000, or more than $1 billion.
288. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2107.
289. Coffee Outline, supra note 234, at 12.
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adopting bidding regimes are more concerned with preventing a
perceived windfall than with maximizing class recovery. One does
not necessarily lead to the other. Rather, the real issue should not
be "whether a particular fee regime will give class members a
larger percentage share of the common fund recovery, but whether
it will maximize the net recovery for the class.""29
CONCLUSION
The theoretical benefits of competitive bidding for lead
counsel in a securities class action are obvious and salutary: the
best lawyers for the best price. Unfortunately, the benefits are just
that-theoretical-and disappear when applied. The original
rationale behind competitive bidding was that this purported
market process "most closely approximates the way class members
themselves would make these decisions,"29' but this rationale is
misguided because "[a]n auction does not simulate the market
process." '292 An auction to select class counsel "is not the way it is
done in the marketplace and dangerously underplays the more
important values of character, compatibility, and specific expertise,
which usually guide selection of counsel." '293  Courts are ill-
equipped to step in and attempt to create a market when a more
efficient one already exists:
The insight of the PSLRA was that the best way to simulate a
market process was to create one by putting a real functioning
consumer [as] the lead plaintiff on one side of the
negotiation... [where] there will be a real live body with a
great deal of sophistication and resources on the consumer side
.... [I]t is a true marketplace where the lead plaintiff may
consider the very same factors that defendants use when they
select counsel .... In these circumstances, the purpose of the
auction to approximate a market of fees has already been
290. Written Statement of Professor Arthur R. Miller, supra note 201, at 15.
291. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 690 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
292. Fisch Affidavit, supra note 212, 46.
293. Goodman Testimony, supra note 168, at 7.
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satisfied through an actual market check.9
Indeed, "there is no need to 'simulate' the market in cases
where a properly-selected [sic] lead plaintiff conducts a good-faith
counsel selection process because in such cases -at least under the
theory supporting the PSLRA-the fee agreed to by the lead
plaintiff is the market fee. ) 295
The PSLRA was enacted to combat the very issues that
competitive bidding sought to remedy, and it vests the selection of
counsel with the lead plaintiff, not the court. Those who drafted
the PSLRA considered and rejected competitive bidding, yet left
courts some discretion under Rule 23 to veto selected counsel if
necessary to guarantee adequate representation. Those who
drafted and edit Rule 23 expressly rejected competitive bidding as
a possible means of guaranteeing adequacy of representation in
securities class actions.96  Accordingly, there exists no legal
justification for allowing competitive bidding.
The purpose of the PSLRA's lead-plaintiff and counsel
provisions was to "strengthen the hand of investors tremendously
by giving them the right to choose the attorneys, giving them the
right decide what the settlement will be, if there is going to be any
settlement, and giving them the right to determine what the
attorney's fees would be."2" If Congress intended investors to
choose counsel and determine fees, it is inconsistent with that
intent to take those decisions away by instituting competitive
bidding. Auctions focus on the selection of counsel, rather than
the empowerment of the most-adequate plaintiff. Such a focus
simply was not intended. Competitive bidding has the potential to
reduce the investigation of fraud, delay the litigation, deter
sophisticated investors from participating in securities class actions,
and yield hasty settlements that fail to benefit the class. These
results conflict with the spirit, text, and purpose of the PSLRA.
294. Eisenhofer & Calder, supra note 227.
295. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19214, at *175 (3d Cir.
Aug. 28, 2001).
296. See supra notes 131-32, and accompanying text.
297. 141 CONG. REC. S17988 (Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(emphasis added).
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Thus, "[i]n the end, then, the benefits
seem chimerical .... Lead counsel
impression of protecting the interests of
actually doing so.""'
of lead counsel auctions
auctions ... create the
the plaintiff class without
298. See Developments in the Law, supra note 243, at 1844-45.
